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PUNISHING WITHOUT FREE WILL
Luis E. Chiesa*
I. INTRODUCTION
Candide: Do you believe that mankind have always been cutting one
another’s throats; that they were always liars, knaves, treacherous and
ungrateful; always thieves, sharpers, highwaymen, lazy, envious and
gluttons; always drunkards, misers, ambitious and blood-thirsty; always
backbiters, debauchees, fanatics, hypocrites and fools?
Martin: Do you not believe that hawks have always preyed upon pigeons,
when they could light upon them?
Candide: Certainly.
Martin: Well, then, if the hawks have always had the same nature, what
reason can you give why mankind should have changed theirs?
Candide: Oh! There is a great deal of difference; because free will
. . . .”1
– Voltaire, Candide
In a few memorable lines of dialogue between Candide and his faithful
servant Martin, Voltaire eloquently conveyed the relevance of free will to our
practices of punishing and blaming. In a naturalistic world, as Martin observes,
human beings are merely another cog in the wheel of nature. As such, it would be
as absurd to blame humans for their sins as it would be to blame hawks for eating
pigeons. The always-optimistic Candide begs to differ. The hawk’s nature is fixed
because animal conduct is determined by natural laws. Mankind’s nature, on the
other hand, is variable because humans have the ability to change their ways. They
have, in other words, free will. And it is because of this uniquely human capacity
to freely choose to do otherwise that humans can and should be blamed for their
crimes.
Modern criminal law seems to reflect Candide’s view of human nature. Free
will is central to retributive theories of punishment.2 For retributivists, the

*
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VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE ch. XXI (1759), available at http://www.ourcivilisation.com/
smartboard/shop/voltaire/candide/chap21.htm.
2
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 9 (2006) (observing that “[t]he so-called
free will postulate is an essential premise of the [retributive] model”).
1
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imposition of punishment is justified solely by reference to the offender’s deserts.3
Under the standard view, the offender deserves punishment only if he could have
abstained from committing the crime. On the other hand, the offender does not
deserve to be punished if he could not have acted otherwise. William Blackstone
asserted this view in his famous Commentaries, “punishments are . . . only
inflicted for the abuse of that free will which God has given to man.”4 In contrast,
it is “highly just and equitable that a man should be excused for those acts which
are done through unavoidable force and compulsion.”5 This conception of the
criminal law continues to influence courts and commentators to this day. As an
appellate court explained several decades ago, “our whole criminal code
presupposes that an individual possesses a free will and is accountable for his
rational conduct.”6
But what if Martin’s view of human nature is more accurate than Candide’s?
What if mankind is no more to blame for their crimes than birds are to blame for
eating their prey? As counterintuitive as Martin’s deterministic account of human
nature might initially sound, many contemporary scientists and philosophers
believe it to be closer to the truth than an account of human nature that
presupposes the existence of free will.7 Recent neuroscientific experiments8
coupled with advances in genetics and related fields9 increasingly suggest that
humans have little control over a wide array of acts that most people believe are
freely willed. This has led some respected scholars to contend, as psychologist
Daniel Wegner famously noted, that free will is nothing more than an “illusion.”10
Some find these views troubling, as they would call into question our practices of
blaming and praising.11 After all, if every human act is determined by forces that
human beings cannot control, how can they be blamed or praised for doing what

3

See generally LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 190 (2006) (discussing
the justification of punishment).
4
IV WILLIAM BLACKSONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1445
(William Draper Lewis ed., 1902).
5
Id.
6
State v. Jones, 577 P.2d 357, 361 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). See also, more recently, the
judgment of the House of Lords in R v. Kennedy, [2007] UKHL 38, [14], stating that “[t]he
criminal law generally assumes the existence of free will” and that “generally speaking,
informed adults of sound mind are treated as autonomous beings able to make their own
decisions how they will act.”
7
See, e.g., Galen Strawson, The Bounds of Freedom, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FREE WILL 441 (Robert Kane ed., 2002).
8
Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of
Cerebral Activity (Readiness Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary
Act, 106 BRAIN, no. 3, 1983 at 623–42.
9
Regarding the way in which genetics and the environment affect our behavior, see
Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate, 41 GEN. PSYCHOLOGIST, no. 1, 2006 at 3–4.
10
DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 1 (2002).
11
Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091, 1144–45
(1985).
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they do?12 This would appear to cast a mortal blow to our criminal law, for most of
the foundational doctrines that undergird our system of criminal justice seem to
lose their coherence when unmoored from free will.13
Nevertheless, we are faced with mounting scientific evidence against the
existence of a uniquely human ability to escape the causal laws of the universe by
way of uncaused conscious processes that mysteriously14 cause human action.
Thus, many philosophers now argue that free will is compatible with
determinism.15 They suggest that humans can be free even if it turns out that all
events that take place in the universe, including human action, are determined by
the interplay between what happened in the past and the present operation of
natural laws.16 According to this account, Martin and Candide’s views of human
nature are not incompatible. Humans who engage in criminal behavior may
possess the sort of free will that makes them responsible for their actions even if
their crimes, like the hawk’s eating of the pigeon, can be fully explained by the
causal laws of nature. But why have philosophers gone out of their way to attempt
to reconcile free will with causal determinism? The answer is simple. The truth of
determinism seems to threaten the free will edifice upon which our formal and
informal institutions of blaming and punishing are built. By demonstrating that
free will is compatible with a universe wholly determined by natural laws, the
philosopher can rescue the criminal law from the threat of determinism without
needing to adopt the unpalatable position of denying determinism’s scientific
plausibility.
Those who attempt to reconcile free will with determinism appear to believe
that many of the things intrinsically important to us, including our practices of
blaming, praising, and punishing, would become meaningless in a world without
free will.17 For example, P. F. Strawson believes that certain attitudes central to the
human experience such as resentment, gratitude, anger, and love cannot be
experienced unless we assume that human beings possess free will.18 If we are to
continue exhibiting the sort of attitudes that make our lives meaningful, we must
presuppose that others are responsible for their actions even if scientists
12

Id.
Id. at 1139, 1144–45.
14
It is “mysterious” to contend that uncaused conscious processes cause human action
because there is presently no scientific account that can explain how this can actually be
the case. So far, experimental evidence suggests that human conduct, including conscious
processes, is determined by causal events that lie beyond our control.
15
These philosophers are dubbed “compatibilists.” See, e.g., Christopher Taylor &
Daniel Dennett, Who’s Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 257.
16
This is the textbook definition of determinism. See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 7, at
442–60.
17
Moore, supra note 11, at 1144–45.
18
Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRITISH ACAD. 1, 1–25 (1962),
reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 45, 45–67 (John Martin Fischer &
Mark Ravizza eds., 1993).
13
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demonstrate that human action is determined by causal forces beyond human
control.19 Similarly, Michael Moore has argued that free will is essential to us
because “[o]ur moral life is built upon our praising or blaming people when they
help a friend, tell a bad joke, create a work of art, or write a clear and truthful
essay.”20 As a result, rejecting free will is undesirable because it would lead to
“falsify[ing] much of our moral life.”21
This Article will argue that there are good moral reasons to conclude that the
scientific plausibility of determinism ought to lead us to abandon the notion of free
will. Contra P. F. Strawson and Moore, this Article suggests that rejecting free will
does not undermine the human experience, and doing so is plausible and attractive
because it would likely lead to more humane and efficient institutions of blaming
and punishing. The argument consists of six parts.
Part II fleshes out in more detail the claim that our criminal laws presuppose
the existence of freely willed actors who are capable of meaningfully controlling
their conduct. This simple postulate seems to lie at the heart of many foundational
doctrines of criminal law, including the voluntary act requirement,22 the insanity
defense,23 and the general theory of excuse defenses.24 It also undergirds certain
important features of the proximate cause25 and mens rea26 doctrines. It is therefore
difficult to deny that free will is embedded in the very fabric of our system of
criminal justice.
Part III examines the current state of the philosophical debates on free will.
After discussing the literature, this Article concludes that the plausibility of the
thesis of causal determinism is undeniable. At the very least, it is unclear whether
humans actually have the ability to consciously control their conduct.27 The
plausibility of determinism has triggered diverse reactions from the philosophical
19

Id.
Moore, supra note 11, at 1144.
21
Id. at 1045.
22
1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 273–81 (2007).
23
Under the Model Penal Code formulation of the insanity defense, an actor is not
criminally liable if he lacks the capacity to conform his conduct to the mandates of the law.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01.
24
See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Rethinking the Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982).
25
According to general principles of proximate causation, “[t]he free, deliberate, and
informed intervention of a second person, who intends to exploit the situation created by
the first, but is not acting in concert with him, is normally held to relieve the first actor of
criminal responsibility.” H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 326
(1985) (emphasis added); see also Glanville Williams, Finis for Novus Actus?, 48
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 391, 392 (1989).
26
According to section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code, for example, a person acts
“purposely” if his “conscious objective” is to commit the crime. MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02 (2001).
27
Manuel Vargas, Response to Kane, Fischer and Pereboom, in FOUR VIEWS ON
FREE WILL 204, 206 (Ernest Sosa ed., 2007).
20
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community. Libertarians believe that determinism is incompatible with free will
and that the recent literature, therefore, threatens to undermine free will.28 They
argue, however, that humans are free because their decisions are ultimately
grounded in irreducibly indeterministic processes, which are likely explained by
the principles undergirding the field of quantum mechanics.29 Hard
incompatibilists, on the other hand, believe that determinism is probably true and
that both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with free will.30 Finally,
compatibilists believe that humans possess free will regardless of the truth of
causal determinism.31 The primary goal of this part is to explore in detail the
positions espoused by libertarians, hard incompatibilists, and compatibilists.
Part IV looks at what legal scholars have to say about the free will debate and
its relevance to criminal theory. Despite the obvious threat that recent scientific
literature on the nature of consciousness poses for the conventional “free will
centered” account of criminal law, legal theorists have paid surprisingly little
attention to the subject. Most seem content to casually point out that it is unclear
whether human beings have the kind of free will that our criminal laws assume we
have. They then proceed to nonchalantly dismiss the problem as one that ought to
be of concern for philosophers rather than lawyers. This is the tack taken by
Douglas Husak in his book chapter on the criminal law’s voluntary act
requirement.32 Others, like George Fletcher, have attempted to defend a libertarian
account of free will by arguing that Noam Chomsky’s theory of language lends
credence to the proposition that human action is inherently indeterminate.33 In
contrast, some, like Stephen Morse,34 Kim Ferzan,35 and Michael Moore,36 adopt
the classic compatibilist stance and argue that the sort of free will that is needed to
make sense of the criminal law is not at odds with determinism. Finally, there are
those who, like Larry Alexander,37 grant that determinism is incompatible with the
28

See, e.g., Robert Kane, Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 406.
29
Taylor & Dennett, supra note 15, at 259.
30
See, e.g., Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard
Incompatibilism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 477.
31
Ishtiyaque Haji, Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 202.
32
DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 78–122 (1987). After
concluding that the law ought to abandon the voluntary act doctrine in favor of what he
dubs the “control requirement,” Husak concedes that a strand of the philosophical literature
on free will casts doubt on whether humans have the ability to exert meaningful control
over their actions. Id. at 98. Surprisingly, however, he goes on to claim that this is a subject
that he need not delve into. Id.
33
FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 273–81 (2007).
34
See, e.g., Stephen Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2545 (2007).
35
LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 15 (2009).
36
Moore, supra note 11.
37
ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 35, at 15 n.22.
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structure of criminal law, but mysteriously declare themselves agnostics with
regard to the truth of determinism.
Given the intractable nature of the free will problem, Part V argues that the
scientific, philosophical, and legal debate on the subject has led to a dialectical
stalemate. A dialectical stalemate arises when proponents of an argument cannot
muster sufficient evidence to decisively prove the argument, while the argument’s
detractors cannot gather sufficient evidence to decisively refute it.38 Those who
claim that humans have enough control over their actions to be considered morally
responsible for their conduct have failed to conclusively demonstrate either that
determinism is probably false39 or that the truth of determinism does not
undermine their claim.40 In contrast, those who suggest that determinism is
probably true and that it is incompatible with the free will necessary for moral
responsibility have failed to decisively demonstrate the latter.41
How are we to proceed in light of this dialectical stalemate? Some criminal
theorists have thrown their hands up in despair and opted to favor the status quo
over radically revising the criminal laws to make them compatible with the
increasingly likely possibility that determinism is true.42 In contrast, Part V argues
that the best way to move beyond the stalemate is to put forth normative arguments
to demonstrate which of the competing solutions to the free will problem makes
our life in general—and our practices of blaming and punishing in particular—
more appealing. After all, if the way out of the free will labyrinth is unclear, why
not embark on the most attractive path until we finally stumble upon evidence that
decisively demonstrates that we are headed in the wrong direction?
Part VI contends that a life without free will is not as bad as most
philosophers and legal scholars would have us believe. Taking a cue from Derk
Pereboom’s writings on the subject,43 this Article suggests that it is not altogether
clear that rejecting the notion of free will inevitably leads to renouncing certain
attitudes that are inextricably part of the human experience. For example, consider
love. Some philosophers have argued that love loses most of its meaning if we
assume that others are not free to choose whether to love us and we are not free to
determine whether to love them in return.44 This is far from obvious, as the case of
small children illustrates. We truly and meaningfully love our newborn children
even if we believe, as we should, that they are not (yet) capable of freely choosing
to love us back. It would also seem that we will not stop loving our spouses,
friends, and extended family merely because it is demonstrated to us that we did
38

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, OUR STORIES: ESSAYS ON LIFE, DEATH, AND FREE WILL
116–17 (2009).
39
This is what libertarians like Kane must prove.
40
This is what compatibilists like Dennett must demonstrate.
41
This is what hard incompatibilists like Pereboom must prove. In light of recent
scientific evidence, it would seem that hard determinists stand on solid footing regarding
their claim that determinism is probably true.
42
ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 35, at 15 n.22.
43
See DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001).
44
Strawson, supra note 18, at 53.
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not freely choose to feel what we feel for them. The same is true with most of the
feelings that make our life worth living.
Part VI also argues that, far from depriving life of meaning, the assumption
that humans lack free will may actually make life more appealing. First, the
practice of blaming other people for their sins and crimes loses meaning in a world
without free will. Contrary to what some have argued, living without blaming
others for their wrongs would not be fatal to interpersonal relationships. If it is
true, as it seems to be, that human action is determined by factors they cannot
control, it would intuitively follow that humans should not be blamed for the
consequences of their conduct. Furthermore, even if we assume that it is fair to
blame humans for engaging in conduct that they cannot control, it is unclear
whether doing so is beneficial for mankind. After all, our practices of blaming
have historically been linked to unappealing attitudes of resentment, anger, and
vengeance. A world that does not encourage the formation of those attitudes
would, at the very least, be less violent and cruel towards those who engage in
wrongdoing. In light of the increasingly inhumane treatment that criminals receive
both in this country and abroad,45 this would appear to be a welcome development.
In Part VII, this Article argues that rather than leading to the disappearance of
criminal law, assuming that humans lack free will might lead to a more appealing
system of criminal justice.46 Once we presuppose that humans do not have enough
control over their acts to be considered responsible for their conduct, it is clear that
imposing punishment on wrongdoers for the purposes of exacting retribution is
unwarranted. As a result, in a world without free will the purpose of punishment
must shift from giving to the offender what he deserves, to protecting society from
dangerous individuals who are nevertheless not to blame for their transgressions.
This Article therefore contends that punishment should be reconceptualized as
a type of quarantine in which individuals who are not responsible for the
conditions that make them dangerous are deprived of certain liberties for the
protection of others.47 Furthermore, just as the government has the responsibility to
treat a person quarantined with swine flu in a manner that ensures her speedy
recovery and encourages her return to life in society, the state should also have the
45

Our current system of criminal justice increasingly relies on incarceration as the
preferred method of punishment for many of the most pervasive offenses committed by
individuals today, such as weapon and drug possession offenses. This has generated a
severe overcrowding problem in America’s prisons. This, in turn, leads to the inhumane
treatment of inmates in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, the failure to
provide them with adequate medical care, the creation of unsafe and unsanitary living
conditions, and the creation of an environment which promotes violence and unrest
amongst the prison population. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–24 (2011). The
magnitude of the problem is such that the United States Supreme Court recently declared
that the overcrowding problem in the California prison system has transformed the
punishment imposed on these inmates into one that is “cruel and unusual” in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Id.
46
See infra notes 335–374 and accompanying text.
47
See infra notes 347–350 and accompanying text.
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duty to treat someone quarantined for committing an offense in a way that
increases the likelihood that he will be able to return to societal life.48
A system of criminal justice that does not assume that humans possess free
will would also rely less on incarceration. We send people to jail mostly because
we believe that they deserve to suffer for what they have done. It would be cruel,
however, to intentionally make people suffer by throwing them in jail for doing
something that they could not have abstained from doing. Consequently, if we
assume that actors lack free will, it should lead us to seek alternatives to
incarceration as a response to crime. This would spur a more efficient criminal
law, as the resources that are consumed by our costly prison system could be
diverted to more socially useful and humane methods of social control.
Finally, the Article concludes by urging criminal lawyers and theorists to take
seriously the idea that we might not have the sort of free will that informs most of
our foundational criminal law doctrines. They should do this for two reasons. First,
the scientific evidence increasingly suggests that humans lack the capacity to
control their acts. Second, a criminal justice system that presupposes that human
beings lack free will is more humane and efficient than one that assumes humans
are free to act as they please. As a result, there are good reasons to believe that the
most attractive way out of the free will maze is to assume that determinism and
indeterminism are incompatible with the type of freedom that lies at the core of
contemporary criminal law and theory.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE WILL TO OUR CURRENT PRACTICES OF BLAMING
AND PUNISHING
Philosophers and scientists have long debated whether humans possess the
sort of free will that undergirds Candide’s account of human nature.49 Although the
debate rages in academic circles, most people assume that we do have the ability to
freely choose our actions, and that, as a result of this capacity, it makes sense to
blame or praise us for engaging in certain acts. This assumption is not only
prevalent, but also deeply held—belief in free will is central to many of the
practices that define our society. Free will is an essential tenet of Judeo-Christian
morality.50 It is also central to our everyday practice of holding our friends and
48

See infra notes 356–361 and accompanying text.
The modern formulation of the free will problem is sometimes traced back to the
writings of Epicurus. See, e.g., Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, in CLASSICS OF MORAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY 455 (2d ed. 1992) (“[N]ecessity is not answerable [to anyone], chance
is unstable; while what occurs by our own agency is autonomous, and that it is to this that
praise and blame are attached.”). Medieval scholars also addressed the free will problem.
See, e.g., 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, question 83, art. 1 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 2d rev. ed. 1920). Modern discussions of the problem
are legion. For a compilation containing representative modern discussions of the free will
problem, see DERK PEREBOOM, FREE WILL (Hackett Pub., 2d ed., 2009).
50
According to Judeo-Christian thought, God created a world full of alternative
courses of action, some of which are good and some of which are bad. Furthermore, he
49

2011]

PUNISHING WITHOUT FREE WILL

1411

loved ones accountable for what they do. When we chide our best friend for not
keeping a secret, we typically do so as a way of expressing our firmly held
conviction that she should have (and could have) abstained from acting the way
she did. Given that belief in free will pervades so many aspects of our lives, it
should come as no surprise that it is also essential to understanding our current
approach to criminal law. In the following pages, this Article discusses some ways
in which belief in free will shapes our practices of blaming and punishing.
A. The Voluntary Act Requirement
As any first-year law student knows, there can be no criminal liability without
proof that the defendant engaged in the actus reus of the offense charged.51 Actus
reus is the Latin term for the “guilty act” which must take place if an individual is
to be subjected to criminal punishment.52 It is a basic principle of criminal law that
an act is “guilty,” and therefore punishable, only if it is voluntary.53 This has come
to be known among courts and commentators as the criminal law’s so-called
“voluntary act principle or requirement.”54 Pursuant to this principle, there can be
no criminal liability for involuntary acts that are “not a product of the effort or the
determination of the actor.”55 As a result, harm brought about by a bodily
movement that is the product of a reflex, convulsion, or sleepwalking does not
trigger the imposition of criminal liability.56 Furthermore, an individual may only
be held liable for what he does rather than for who he is. As a result, the criminal
law may legitimately prohibit the act of acquiring cocaine, but not the status of
being a drug addict.57
The nexus between the voluntary act requirement and free will is evident. An
act may lack free will if it is the product of the actor’s volition but internal or
endowed humans with the capacity to freely choose amongst these alternative courses of
action. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 30:19 (“I [God] have set before you life and death, blessing
and cursing: therefore choose life . . .”).
51
See HUSAK, supra note 33, at 78.
52
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (9th ed. 2009).
53
E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (2001).
54
See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 97 (1968) (tracing
the legal understanding of voluntary action to John Austin, who theorized that a human
action is a “muscular contraction” caused by a “volition” or an “act of will”).
55
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d).
56
According to the MODEL PENAL CODE section 2.01(2), reflexes, convulsions and
bodily movements during unconsciousness or sleep “are not voluntary acts within the
meaning of this Section.” See also State v. Sowry, 803 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004) (“[A]cts performed while unconscious or sleepwalking are not voluntary acts [that
generate criminal liability].”); State v. Case, 672 A.2d 586, 589 (Me. 1996) (“To be
voluntary an act must be the result of an exercise of defendant’s conscious choice to
perform [it], and not the result of reflex [or] convulsion . . . .”).
57
The prohibition of status crimes is so fundamental that the Supreme Court has held
that the Eighth Amendment proscribes punishing mere status. Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962).
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external pressures undermine the actor’s volition significantly.58 On the other hand,
an act may also lack free will when it is not the product of the actor’s volition.59
Conduct that fails to satisfy the criminal law’s voluntary act requirement is an
example of the latter type of conduct. Involuntary acts are thus not reflective of
free will. This is one of the reasons why the voluntary act requirement is such an
essential feature of our criminal law. As the Seventh Circuit noted:
In the narrowest sense, every crime must be the product of defendant’s
free will; it must reflect his choice to perform the criminal act. If the act
itself was the result of a mere reflex, or muscular spasm, or was caused
by physical duress or compulsion, even the narrowest intent would be
absent and the defendant would be innocent of crime; indeed, it could be
said that he did not act at all. It is in this sense that the traditional defense
of “compulsion” or “necessity” may justify an act that would be unlawful
if it had reflected a deliberate exercise of the defendant’s free will.60
The voluntary act principle reflects the deeply held belief that it is unfair to punish
someone for engaging in acts that are not the product of a free will.
B. Legal Causation
If a defendant is charged with a crime that brings about a harmful
consequence, she can only be held liable if her conduct caused the harmful
consequence to materialize. A defendant’s conduct is considered a cause of the
harm only if it is both an “actual” and “legal” (or “proximate”) cause of the harm.61
Conduct is an “actual” cause of harm if the harm would not have occurred but for
the defendant’s act.62 The standard for determining whether the defendant’s
conduct was a “legal” cause of the harm is not settled. Some courts have held that
58

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle points out that there is a sense in which acts
done under extreme pressure, such as throwing cargo overboard during a storm in order to
save oneself, are not voluntary and thus not reflective of free will, for no one would choose
any such act in itself. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 52–53 (Martin Ostwald trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962).
59
According to Robert Nozick, for example, we lack free will if we are not the
originators of our acts. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 291–92 (1981).
Therefore, we lack free will when our acts are the product of something other than our
volitions.
60
United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390–91 (7th Cir. 1971).
61
See, e.g., State v. Rivas, 896 P.2d 57, 62 (Wash. 1995) (“In crimes which are
defined to require specific conduct resulting in a specified result, the defendant’s conduct
must be the “legal” or “proximate” cause of the result. Before criminal liability is imposed,
the conduct of the defendant must be both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the “legal” or
“proximate” cause of the result.” (citation omitted)).
62
E.g., People v. Zak, 457 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (citing a well-known
criminal law treatise, the court stated that “[a] factor is an actual cause of a result if the
result would not have occurred when it did in the absence of that factor”).
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determinations of legal causation hinge on whether the harm was foreseeable in
light of defendant’s conduct,63 while others have suggested that legal causation
depends on whether the harmful result can be directly traced back to the
defendant’s conduct.64 In contrast, the Model Penal Code suggests that the
defendant’s conduct ought to be considered the legal cause of the harm unless the
connection between the act and the harm that resulted is too tenuous to have a just
bearing on the defendant’s liability.65 Regardless of which view of proximate cause
is adopted, courts and commentators agree that an event that takes place after the
defendant has acted but before the harm has materialized may sever the link
between the defendant’s conduct and the harm.66 There is also agreement that such
intervening events are more likely to break the causal connection between the
defendant’s act and the harm if the events involve a voluntary act by the victim or
a third party.67
Examples abound that illustrate the relevance of the victim’s voluntary
conduct to determinations of legal causation. Perhaps the most common example
involves an actor who provides another person the means with which to commit
suicide.68 Does this conduct constitute homicide? The general rule in these cases is
that the defendant is not liable for homicide because the victim’s voluntary
decision to commit suicide constitutes an intervening cause, which breaks the
causal link between the defendant’s action (supplying the means to commit
suicide) and the result that ensued (death of the victim).69 Given that the victim’s
conduct is irrelevant to the criminal law,70 why do the victim’s voluntary acts
determine the defendant’s liability in this context? It seems that the voluntary
conduct of the victim is important in these cases because freely willed acts occupy
a special place in our legal judgments about the causal connections between certain
events. For better or worse, the law of causation reflects a deeply held belief that
freely willed acts have more causal force than non-freely willed acts. As one
Alabama court stated, “[a] determination as to whether the conduct of a person
63

E.g., Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Obviously,
some element of foreseeability limits criminal causation just as it limits principles of civil
‘proximate causation.’”).
64
See, e.g., People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E.2d 773, 773–74 (N.Y. 1974) (asserting that the
defendants should not be found guilty unless their conduct “was a cause of death
sufficiently direct as to meet the requirements of the criminal, and not the tort, law”).
65
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (2001).
66
The reference is, of course, to the doctrine of intervening causation. For a
discussion of intervening causation in the criminal law, see Starkenburg v. State, 934 P.2d
1018, 1022–26 (Mont. 1997) (discussing intervening acts by a third-party).
67
See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 162 (1997) (discussing cases in
which a voluntary intervening act by the victim was found to break the causal connection).
68
See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 735–39 (Mich. 1994).
69
See id. at 445.
70
See generally VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND VICTIMS’ WRONGS:
COMPARATIVE LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 9–35 (2009) (explaining that the victim’s
conduct is irrelevant except for a few exceptions).
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caused the suicide of another must necessarily include an examination of the
victim’s free will,” since “[c]ases have consistently held that the ‘free will of the
victim is seen as an intervening cause which . . . breaks the chain of causation’
between the defendant’s act and the victim’s death.”71
C. Mens Rea
Edward Coke’s often-cited assertion that actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
rea is as true today as it was when it was first asserted.72 The Latin maxim means
that an “act does not make a person guilty unless their mind is also guilty.” This
mens rea requirement has generally led to punishing the occurrence of harm only if
the actor intended to bring about the harm.73 Although punishing negligent
wrongdoing is not unheard of, most core criminal offenses can only be committed
intentionally.74 Criminalization of negligently caused harm is mostly relegated to
so-called public welfare offenses whose commission does not usually stigmatize
the offender in the same way as the commission of a core crime such as rape or
theft.75 In spite of the traditional reluctance to punish negligent harm, some core
offenses can be committed negligently. The most salient example is the
criminalization of negligent homicide, which is considered an offense in every
American jurisdiction.76 However, even when a harm caused by a negligent act is
criminalized, it is always punished less severely than an intentional act causing the
same kind of harm.77
It is difficult to explain criminal law’s unwillingness to punish negligent
wrongdoing, especially since, as tort law illustrates, damage caused by the
negligent wrongdoer is, all things being equal, identical to damage caused by an
71

Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766, 771 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (quoting S.W. Brenner,
Undue Influence in the Criminal Law: A Proposed Analysis of the Criminal Offense of
“Causing Suicide,” 147 ALB. L. REV. 62, 83 (1982)).
72
3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING TREASON
AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES, at c.1, fo.10 (1797).
73
See, e.g., Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952) (“[A]n injury
can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention.”).
74
This is the case, for example, with the offenses of rape, robbery, burglary and
kidnapping. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (2001) (Rape); id. § 222.1 (Robbery); id.
§ 221.1 (Burglary); id. § 212.1 (Kidnapping). When the definition of an offense does not
include a mental state, the offense can only be committed purposely, knowingly, or
recklessly, but not negligently. Id. § 2.02(3).
75
The classic discussion of public welfare offenses is still Francis B. Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
76
The Model Penal Code’s negligent homicide provision is illustrative of the typical
negligent homicide statute. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4.
77
Negligent homicide is always punished less severely than intentional homicide. In
New York, for example, negligent homicide is a Class E felony, whereas intentional
homicide is either a Class B or Class A felony. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10
(McKinney 2009) (criminally negligent homicide), with id. §§ 125.25–125.27 (versions of
intentional homicide).
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intentional wrongdoer.78 For example, an actor who kills a victim by deliberately
poisoning her inflicts the same harm as the actor who kills a victim by carelessly
running her over with his car, regardless of the actor’s mental state when
committing the offense. Nevertheless, the careless killing will be punished much
less severely than the intentional killing. The standard explanation for this
differential treatment is that an actor who intentionally causes harm is more
blameworthy than an actor who negligently causes the same harm.79 After all, as
Oliver Wendell Holmes pointed out when discussing the different moral quality of
intentional and negligent acts, “even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled
over and being kicked.”80
The perceived differences in the blameworthiness of these acts are
inextricably linked to beliefs about the degree of free will with which intentional
and negligent wrongdoers act. Intentional harm causation is thus believed more
deserving of condemnation than negligent harm causation because, as the Supreme
Court stated in Morrissette v. United States, of the criminal law’s “universal and
persistent . . . belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”81 As a result of
this belief, some argue that “our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of
punishing the vicious will,” for it assumes that the paradigmatic case of
wrongdoing is that of a “free agent confronted with a choice between doing right
and doing wrong and freely choosing . . . to do wrong.”82
D. Legal Insanity
In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten attempted to assassinate the British Prime
Minister.83 Given that M’Naghten claimed that he committed the crime while in a
state of mental incapacity, the House of Lords came up with a set of rules for
determining when a defendant should be acquitted as a result of insanity. The rule
set out by the House of Lords in the case, known as the M’Naghten test for legal
insanity, holds that a defendant should be relieved of criminal liability only if at
the time of the crime he suffered from a defect of reason or mental disease that
78

Punitive damages can be imposed on the intentional wrongdoer. This aspect of tort
law, as the term “punitive” implies, more closely resembles criminal than civil law. See
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 48 (1983) (recognizing that “punitive damages in tort cases
may be awarded not only for actual intent to injure or evil motive, but also for recklessness,
serious indifference to or disregard for the rights of others, or even gross negligence”).
79
See generally JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 135–41
(1960) (evaluating the various theories behind punishing negligent homicide).
80
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
81
Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
82
Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS B. SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON
CRIMINAL LAW, at xxix, xxxvi–xxxvii (1927).
83
Michael Stoll, Note, Miles to Go Before We Sleep: Arizona’s “Guilty Except
Insane” Approach to the Insanity Defense and Its Unrealized Promise, 97 GEO. L.J. 1767,
1772 (2009).
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prevented him from appreciating the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his act.84
Several decades after M’Naghten’s case was decided, courts started invoking a
different standard of insanity that has been dubbed the “irresistible impulse” test.85
According to the irresistible impulse test, a defendant should be acquitted if at the
time of the commission of the offense he suffered from a mental disease or
condition that prevented him from controlling his conduct.86
Subsequently, the drafters of the Model Penal Code decided to combine the
M’Naghten and “irresistible impulse” tests.87 Under the Model Penal Code, a
defendant will be acquitted for reason of insanity if at the time of the crime he
suffered from a mental condition or defect that caused him to lack substantial
capacity88 either to appreciate the wrongfulness89 of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the mandates of the law. Although the M’Naghten test continues to be
applied in many American jurisdictions, a substantial number of states apply the
Model Penal Code’s combined M’Naghten-Irresistible Impulse test.90
The M’Naghten test of legal insanity illustrates the role of free will in criminal
law. The test focuses on whether the cognitive capabilities of the defendant were
undermined by mental disease or defect in a way that prevented him from
appreciating the import of his conduct and the consequences of his acts. These
cognitive impairments preclude the imposition of liability because, as one judge
put it, they weaken “the power in man to make a choice between alternative
courses of action.”91 Thus, courts frequently construe the M’Naghten rules as a
vehicle to determine whether the defendant exercised the sort of free will that
undergirds our conventional practices of blaming and punishing. Consequently,
84
85

M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722–23 (1843).
The irresistible impulse test can be traced back to Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854 (Ala.

1887).

86

Id. The test has also come to be known as the “policeman at the elbow” test, for it is
asserted that someone commits a crime pursuant to an irresistible impulse if he would have
committed the offense even if a police officer was standing next to him. For a relatively
recent discussion of the “policeman at the elbow” test, see People v. Jackson, 627 N.W.2d
11, 13–14 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
87
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001).
88
The Model Penal Code standard broadens the scope of the insanity defense, for it
merely requires a showing of a lack of “substantial capacity” to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the conduct or to control the act rather than a showing of a complete
absence of knowledge (M’Naghten) or a total lack of control over the conduct (irresistible
impulse). See id.
89
The drafters of the Model Penal Code pointed out that states drafting an insanity
defense have to choose between requiring that the actor “lack capacity to appreciate” the
wrongfulness of his conduct or demanding that the actor lack capacity to understand the
criminality of his conduct. Id. The difference is significant. An actor does not appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct if he fails to see that his act is legally or morally wrongful.
In contrast, an actor does not appreciate the criminality of his conduct if he fails to see that
his conduct is against the law.
90
See 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 104 (15th ed. 1994).
91
State v. Esser, 115 N.W.2d 505, 529 (Wis. 1962) (Hallows, J., dissenting).
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many courts that adhere to the M’Naghten standard of insanity do so because
“[t]he criminal law has long been based upon the concept of freedom of choice and
adherence to the M'Naghten test . . . recognizes that those who are incapable of
understanding the wrongfulness of their conduct have no opportunity of choice
. . . .”92
The “irresistible impulse” test focuses on impairment of defendant’s volitional
capabilities rather than the undermining of his cognitive faculties like M’Naghten,
but the rationale underlying the judicial recognition of the irresistible impulse rule
is also tied to the concept of free will. Thus, it is widely believed that the
irresistible impulse rule may be invoked only when a defendant demonstrates that
the commission of the criminal act “[could not] be resisted or overcome because
insanity or mental disease has destroyed the freedom of will, the power of selfcontrol, and the choice of [the defendant’s] actions.”93 Given that the Model Penal
Code test combines the M’Naghten rule with the irresistible impulse standard for
legal insanity, it is sensible to conclude that the Model Penal Code’s formulation
of the defense is connected to free will in much the same manner as the other two
tests.
E. Duress
A defendant may successfully invoke the defense of duress when he is
coerced to engage in wrongful conduct by the use of unlawful force upon the
defendant or a third person.94 According to the Model Penal Code, the force with
which the defendant is coerced must be of such a nature that a “person of
reasonable firmness . . . would have been unable to resist [it].”95 A defendant who
commits a crime under duress cannot be fairly blamed for engaging in the unlawful
act.96 Therefore, the duress defense functions as an excuse that negates the actor’s
culpability without excluding the wrongfulness of his act.97 The duress excuse is
sometimes called the defense of “compulsion,”98 given that the defendant who acts
under duress is “compelled” by threats to engage in an act that he otherwise would
not perform. The coercive force that triggers the duress defense must imminently
jeopardize the life or limb of the defendant or his family.99 Therefore, it is
generally held that threats to property cannot ground a successful duress defense.
The idea underlying this distinction is that society can legitimately expect citizens
92

People v. Horn, 205 Cal. Rptr. 119, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Snider v. Smyth, 187 F. Supp. 299, 302 (E.D. Va. 1960).
94
See, e.g., Smith v. State, 229 P.3d 221, 226 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
95
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (2001).
96
See FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 148–49.
97
Excuse defenses negate the actor’s blameworthiness without negating the
wrongfulness of the act. In contrast, justification defenses negate the wrongfulness of the
act. Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 741, 746–48 (2008) (discussing the justification/excuse distinction).
98
See, e.g., State v. Baker, 197 P.3d 421, 426–27 (Kan. 2008).
99
Id. at 427.
93
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to sacrifice their property interests in order to avoid wrongfully harming others,
whereas it cannot legitimately require its citizens to sacrifice their lives, the lives
of their loved ones, or physical integrity in order to prevent unlawful harm to
others.100
Amongst the many theories that have been advanced to explain the
exculpatory force of duress, the two most commonly invoked are the
“involuntariness” and the “hard choice” theories of duress. According to the
involuntariness theory, “duress exculpates actors whose choice-making capabilities
are substantially reduced by the coercive situation that generates the defense.”101 In
these cases, the reduction in the actor’s freedom to choose is so significant that the
coerced actor’s choice is in reality “no choice at all”—the duress exculpates the
actor because her capacity to choose to do otherwise is “absent” in light of the
coercion.102 According to the hard choice theory of duress, an actor is excused
when the coercive situation puts him in the undesirable position of having to
decide to preserve either his life or bodily integrity or the fundamental interests of
others.103 Those who face this “do it or else” situation do not act culpably if they
choose to harm others because society believes that a reasonable person facing the
same hard choice would have acted in the same manner.
Not surprisingly, what the involuntariness and hard choice theories of duress
have in common is that the exculpatory force of the defense is in some way tied to
the breadth and scope of the actor’s choices. The less choice we have and the
harder the choice becomes, the less responsible we are for our “choice.” Thus, the
conventional understanding of the duress defense presupposes the existence of an
individual endowed with freedom of choice whose will is overborne by coercive
threats.104

100

See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, ¶ 12(c) (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997) (suggesting that duress creates “no moral
alternative” for the person acting under it).
101
Chiesa, supra note 97, at 758; see also People v. Graham, 129 Cal. Rptr. 31, 32
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (establishing that the defendant has the “burden of showing duress”
by a raising a reasonable doubt); State v. Rouleau, 528 A.2d 343, 350 (Conn. 1987)
(“[D]uress may be seen as removing the very basis of criminal culpability.”).
102
See MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 251 (2002).
103
For an examination and defense of the “hard-choice” theory of excuse and duress,
see Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 114, 124–29 (William C.
Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1567, 1663–64 (1990).
104
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wojciechowski, No. 92456, 2000 WL 537244, at *3
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000) (stating that the prosecution must “prove[] beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime was the result of that person’s free will and not the result of
duress or coercion such as would destroy that person’s free will”); see also Minton v. State,
305 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that defendant’s conduct is only criminal
if he decided to commit the crime “as a result of his own free will . . . not the result of
duress or coercion which would overcome his free will”).
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F. Entrapment
An actor may sometimes invoke police entrapment as a defense to criminal
liability. There are two versions of the entrapment defense. According to the
“objective” version of the defense, a defendant who the police instigated to commit
a crime may successfully plead entrapment “if the law enforcement conduct is
likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense.”105
Therefore, the objective approach to entrapment “focus[es] on the conduct of the
police and [is] not concerned with the defendant’s prior criminal activity or other
indicia of a predisposition to commit crime.”106 In contrast, the subjective version
of entrapment focuses on the defendant’s readiness to commit the crime rather than
on the outrageousness of the governmental conduct.107 More specifically, the
subjective version of the defense can only be invoked if the police induced a
person to commit an offense that he was not predisposed to commit prior to being
approached by governmental authorities.108 Therefore, “[t]he subjective defense of
entrapment succeeds only if the government, not the accused, is the source of the
criminal design.”109 The defense, however, “fails if the accused is previously
disposed to commit the crime, and the government merely facilitates or assists the
criminal scheme.”110 Although the objective version of the defense has garnered
considerable support amongst commentators, and was adopted by the drafters of
the Model Penal Code, the subjective approach to entrapment continues to be
applied in a majority of American jurisdictions.111
With the understanding that the subjective version of entrapment allows the
actor to invoke the defense only if he was not predisposed to commit the crime
before being approached by the police, the defense fails if his decision to commit
the criminal act was a product of his own volition. On the other hand, the
defendant can successfully invoke entrapment if he proves that the police caused
him to decide to commit the offense. Whether the entrapment defense bars
criminal liability thus hinges on whether the defendant can be said to have freely
willed the commission of the crime. More specifically, the entrapment defense will
succeed if the defendant did not freely will the commission of the crime because
the police caused him to engage in the wrongful act. However, the defendant’s
entrapment claim will fail if he voluntarily decided to commit the crime.
It has been held that “[o]nce the entrapment defense is raised, the State bears
the burden of showing that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime and
that the level of police activity did not persuasively affect the free will of the

105

People v. Watson, 990 P.2d. 1031, 1032 (Cal. 2000).
Commonwealth v. Weiskerger, 554 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1989).
107
See, e.g., Hernández v. State, 17 So. 3d 748, 750–51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
108
See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–50 (1992).
109
One Way Fare v. Dep’t of Consumer Prot., 901 A.2d 1246, 1249 (Conn. App. Ct.
2006).
110
Id.
111
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.8(b) (2d ed. 2003).
106
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accused.”112 Therefore, the determinative inquiry in entrapment cases is whether
“the agents overpowered the free will of the defendant and caused him to commit”
an offense that he was not predisposed to commit.113 Therefore, the availability of
the subjective version of the entrapment defense, as with many other criminal
defenses, depends on considerations of free will and voluntariness.
III. DO WE HAVE FREE WILL? SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
Free will is as essential to explaining our current practices of blaming and
punishing as it is to understanding Candide’s view of human nature.114 But do we
really have the sort of free will that allows us to make sense of Candide’s
conception of evil and in turn furnishes the foundations for our system of criminal
justice? At first glance, this appears to be a silly question. After all, humans share a
deeply held belief that what we do is usually a product of what we consciously
want to do. However, as history demonstrates, widely shared beliefs often turn out
to be false. For thousands of years, humans believed that the world was flat and
that earth stood still while the sun and the planets revolved around it. Could it be
that, despite appearances to the contrary, the widely shared belief that humans are
endowed with free will is as false as these other once widely held beliefs are? As it
turns out—and as the rest of this section explains—it is still very much an open
question whether we do in fact have the kind of free will that undergirds our
criminal laws.
A. Causal Determinism and the Free Will Problem
One of the problems frequently presented in debates about free will is that the
meaning of “free will” often remains undefined or is only vaguely or confusingly
fleshed out. In order to avoid such confusion, fruitful discussions about the nature
and importance of free will must begin by defining the term. The problem is that
there are many plausible ways to define free will.115 So how can one defend
choosing one definition of free will over another? A nonarbitrary and promising
way to choose amongst competing definitions of free will is to select the definition
that sheds more light on the question addressed by the author. It thus makes sense
to define free will for the purposes of this Article in a way that illuminates the
112

Jordan v. State, 692 N.E.2d 481, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
United States v. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2004)).
114
See supra notes 1–21 and accompanying text.
115
Thomas Hobbes, for example, defined free will as acting in an uncoerced fashion
or, more specifically, acting in the absence of external impediments. THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 86 (1904). In contrast, Harry Frankfurt defines free will as an action performed
under circumstances in which the actor identifies with the volition that motivated his act.
Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in FREE WILL 81–95
(Gary Watson ed., 1982). Other philosophers define free will differently. See generally
Taylor & Dennett, supra note 15, at 258 (stating multiple definitions of free will).
113
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connection between free will and criminal liability. Free will is relevant to criminal
liability because blame is typically a prerequisite for the imposition of punishment.
It is generally believed that an actor can be blamed for committing an offense only
if he freely willed to engage in conduct constitutive of the offense. As a result, it
makes sense to define free will for the purposes of this Article as the degree of
freedom that makes judgments of blame and attributions of moral responsibility
possible.
Once free will is defined in this manner, it is easy to see why many
contemporary scientists and philosophers believe that free will is threatened by
causal determinism.116 Causal determinism is the belief that everything that
happens in the universe, including human conduct, is the product of everything that
has happened in the past in combination with the operation of natural laws.117
Contrary to what some have argued, causal determinism does not lead to the
conclusion that human desires and intentions cannot impact future events because
“what will be, will be” regardless of what actors wish or desire to do. Aristotle, for
example, claimed that if causal determinism obtains there would be no need to
deliberate or think about our future actions because whatever will happen will in
fact happen regardless of what we think or do.118 Determinists do not necessarily
share this thesis, because they believe that human conduct is causally determined
by myriad factors, including intentions, motives, and desires. Whether a
Mayweather-Pacquiao boxing match will take place in the future is causally
conditioned by a series of factors, including, but not limited to, the desires of
Mayweather and Pacquiao. Determinists, of course, also believe that such intents,
motives, and desires are causally determined by other factors, such as the actor’s
upbringing and her genetic makeup.119 This, however, does not commit the
determinist to believing that human beliefs and desires cannot impact future states
of affairs, for the determinist thesis affirms the causal role played by such
subjective mental states.
There are at least four reasons that suggest the thesis of causal determinism
ought to be taken seriously. First, there is scientific support for the view that the
behavior of macroscopic objects (including human beings) is causally determined
by the confluence of the past and natural laws. The conventional view is that
classical physics is mostly a deterministic affair. 120 There are, however, instances
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See generally THOMAS PINK, FREE WILL: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 14–16
(2004) (explaining the concept of causal determinism and demonstrating that the existence
of human free will is likely dependent on the truth of causal determinism).
117
John Martin Fischer, Compatibilism, in FOUR VIEWS ON FREE WILL 44, 54.
118
ARISTOTLE, DE INTERPRETATIONE, ch. 9, §§ 18b31–3 (John Lloyd Ackrill trans.
1975).
119
See PINK, supra note 116, at 7; John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derek
Pereboom & Manuel Vargas, A Brief Introduction to Some Terms and Concepts, in FOUR
VIEWS ON FREE WILL 1, 3.
120
See generally JOHN EARMAN, A PRIMER ON DETERMINISM (Robert S. Butts ed.,
1986).
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in which the deterministic nature of classical physics breaks down.121 Contrarily,
quantum mechanics is conventionally viewed as mostly governed by
indeterminism. Nevertheless, there might be instances in which determinism seeps
into quantum mechanics.122 In any case, there seems to be significant scientific
support for the view that some have called “adequate determinism,” which holds
that indeterministic quantum effects are mostly negligible at the macroscopic level.
Second, neuroscientific studies, such as the ones famously carried out by Benjamin
Libet, suggest that human conduct is determined by unconscious processes that are
not within the control of the actor.123 Third, biological studies demonstrate that
some aspects of human behavior are largely determined by our genetic makeup.124
Finally, several psychological studies hint at the possibility that many aspects of
human behavior are determined to a significant extent by environmental factors.125
None of these reasons alone are enough to establish the truth of causal
determinism. Nevertheless, the combination of all of these factors does, at the very
least, cast serious doubt on whether human conduct can be traced back to
indeterministic processes. In fact, the strongest evidence to date in favor of the
conclusion that human conduct is not causally determined is the robust, but
scientifically unsupported, intuition that we control our destinies in a way that
belies the thesis of determinism.
Most people believe that actors can be blamed or praised for what they do
only if they have the ability to choose to act differently. Philosophers call this the
principle of alternate possibilities.126 Causal determinism threatens the principle of
alternate possibilities because it suggests that, given the fixity of the past and the
immutability of natural laws, humans lack control over the factors that shape their
conduct. As a result, some philosophers—called incompatiblists—have concluded
that free will is incompatible with causal determinism.127 “Libertarian”
incompatibilists believe that we possess free will because the thesis of causal
determinism is likely false.128 In contrast, “hard incompatibilists” believe that if
121

Id.
See Robert C. Bishop, Determinism and Indeterminism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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causal determinism is true, we should abandon the idea of free will. They also
argue that free will is incompatible with indeterminism.129 The so-called
“compatibilists” believe that we have the sort of free will that underlies our
judgments of blame and praise even if causal determinism obtains.130 The
remainder of Part III explores in more detail the views held by libertarians, hard
incompatibilists and compatibilists.
B. Libertarianism
Libertarians argue that belief in free will is not compatible with a
deterministic account of human behavior. According to libertarianism, true
freedom of the will requires actual and accessible alternative possibilities.131 That
is, conduct is free in the sense required for moral responsibility if, and only if, the
actor could have chosen to do otherwise.132 An actor has access to alternative
possibilities if there are different possible courses of conduct available to him and
it is ultimately up to him to decide which one of the options to pursue. Libertarians
concede that actors would not have access to these alternative possibilities if the
thesis of causal determinism were true.133 Nevertheless, they argue that humans do
have access to the alternative possibilities that free will requires because causal
determinism is false.134 Thus, libertarians maintain that irreducibly indeterminate
processes ultimately produce human conduct.135 As a result, the soundness of the
libertarian thesis depends on whether a plausible scientific case can be made that
undetermined forces cause human conduct, unlike the behavior of most other
things in the universe.
The distinguished libertarian philosopher Robert Kane has come up with an
ingenious way of defending the thesis that human behavior can be traced back to
indeterministic processes. Kane mounts his defense of indeterminism by
borrowing heavily from the field of quantum mechanics.136 Quantum mechanics
are the laws of physics that apply to the behavior of atomic and subatomic
particles.137 What makes quantum mechanics interesting—and what made Einstein
cringe whenever he talked about the implications of the theory—is that atomic and
subatomic particles behave quite differently than larger particles.138 Whereas the
129
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behavior of macroscopic particles appears to be fully determined by causal laws,
quantum mechanics suggests that the behavior of microscopic particles is not
causally determined in the same way.139 More specifically, quantum mechanics
holds that we can attempt to predict the behavior of subatomic particles, but we
can never be certain of how these particles are actually going to behave.140 Kane
puts this insight to good use by positing that the neuron firings that ultimately
determine our conduct are the product of processes that originate at the subatomic
level and, therefore, are not fully determined by the past and the operation of
natural laws.141 This allows Kane to suggest that, in light of quantum mechanics
and the possibility that such processes undergird the workings of the human brain,
causal determinism may very well prove to be false, at least insofar as it purports
to explain human behavior.142
C. Hard Incompatibilism
Hard incompatibilists, like libertarians, believe that free will is incompatible
with causal determinism.143 However, unlike libertarians, hard incompatibilists
argue that free will is also incompatible with indeterminism. Therefore, hard
incompatibilists suggest that belief in free will should be abandoned regardless of
whether human conduct is causally determined.144 There are at least two reasons
that lead hard incompatibilists to reject the existence of the sort of free will that
undergirds our judgments of blame and praise. First, if causal determinism is true,
it would seem that humans lack the ability to do something that seems to be
essential to their moral responsibility—the capacity to do otherwise or, at the very
least, the capacity for the agent to be the ultimate source or originator of her
decision to act in a particular way.145
Furthermore, proponents of hard incompatibilism argue that free will is
undermined even if it turns out that human conduct is the product of
indeterministic processes. They do so by contending that it only makes sense to
blame or praise us for our acts if we are the ultimate source of the desires, motives
and intentions that shape our conduct.146 If, however, it turns out that our beliefs,
intentions, and motives are the product of indeterministic processes that are not
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governed by causal laws, it would seem that our decisions and acts would be the
product of random and haphazard events that we cannot control and thus cannot
ground the sort of freedom that undergirds our judgments of desert.147
A famous recent argument in favor of the hard incompatibilist claim that
determinism is incompatible with free will is Derk Pereboom’s “four case
manipulation argument.”148 The first case put forth in the argument presents us
with an evil neuroscientist who creates a human that can be manipulated directly
by radio controls and who is in fact manipulated by the scientist in a way that
causes him to murder Ms. White.149 In the next case, the neuroscientist creates a
human who cannot be directly manipulated like in the first case, but who has a
brain that is programmed in a way that causally determines him to murder Ms.
White.150 The third case tells the story of an ordinary human who has been
rigorously trained since he was an infant by his parents and his community in a
way that causes him to have certain inclinations and character traits that, in turn,
cause him to murder Ms. White.151 Finally, in the fourth case we have a normal
human being living in a universe where causal determinism obtains who is caused
to murder Ms. White as a result of the interplay of events that happened in the past
(e.g., his upbringing) and the operation of natural laws.152 Pereboom then contends
that our intuitions strongly suggest that the agent is not responsible in cases one
and two.153 If so, he argues that, given the similarities between cases two and three,
and cases three and four, we should also conclude that the agents in cases three and
four are not responsible, because the ultimate causes of the agent’s action in all of
these instances can be traced back to events beyond the agent’s control.154 If one
accepts this conclusion, then causal determinism is incompatible with free will,
because the agent in case four is like any human being who acts in a causally
determined universe.155
D. Compatibilism
The so-called “compatibilists” have staked out an increasingly important
stance on the free will debate. The adherents of this theory do not deny the
plausibility of the thesis of causal determinism. As a matter of fact, some
compatibilists believe that causal determinism is likely true.156 Nevertheless, the
147
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compatibilist argument suggests that humans possess the sort of free will that
underlies judgments of moral responsibility regardless of whether it turns out that
causal determinism is true.157 As a result, the defenders of compatibilism believe
that free will is not threatened at all by causal determinism.158 Although
compatibilists agree that the freedom of will that is needed to justify our practices
of blaming and punishing is compatible with the truth of causal determinism, there
is significant disagreement regarding the reasons that justify this conclusion. While
many compatibilists espouse so-called “mesh” accounts of compatibilism,159 others
endorse what can be dubbed a “reactive attitudes” account of compatibilism.160
Furthermore, some theorists refuse to label themselves as “compatibilists”
although their accounts of free will and its relationship with moral responsibility
seem to share important features of the compatibilist stance.161
According to mesh accounts of compatibilism, an actor’s will is free if there is
an appropriate “mesh or connection” between her choices and her desires and
preferences.162 Perhaps the most influential mesh account of compatibilism is
Harry Frankfurt’s.163 The starting point of Frankfurt’s theory is that humans have
both first and second order volitions.164 First order volitions are volitions to bring
about an action or a certain state of affairs,165 such as my desire to eat the
Cheesecake Factory’s sinful red velvet cheesecake. In contrast, second order
volitions are volitions about first order volitions,166 such as my desire to not desire
to eat the aforementioned red velvet cheesecake. According to Frankfurt, an actor
acts freely only if his second order volition is aligned with his first order
volition,167 such as when I eat the red velvet cheesecake in circumstances in which
I desire to eat the red velvet cheesecake and I desire to act in accordance with my
desire to eat the red velvet cheesecake. Contrarily, an actor does not act freely
when her second order volition is not consistent with her first order volition, such
as when I eat a red velvet cheesecake that I desired to eat although I did not desire
to act in accordance with my desire to eat the dessert (because I am on a diet, for
example).168 Frankfurt’s theory is compatibilist because an agent can act freely
under her account as long as the actor’s second order volition is connected in a
certain way with her first order volition (i.e., she eats the cheesecake and she
desires to act in accordance with her desire to eat the cheesecake) even if she
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cannot do anything other than what she does in light of the causally determined
nature of the universe (i.e., she cannot decide to abstain from eating the cake).169
Several decades ago, P. F. Strawson advanced another influential account of
compatibilism. Strawson’s theory begins by positing the importance of “reactive
attitudes” to the human experience.170 Reactive attitudes are reactions that are
essential to establishing and maintaining personal relationships.171 These reactions
include, but are not limited to, feelings of resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger,
and love.172 According to Strawson, we act freely and, therefore, are morally
responsible for our conduct when we behave in a way that generates reactive
attitudes in others.173 Strawson believes that this type of freedom and moral
responsibility is not undermined by the truth of causal determinism.174 More
specifically, he argues that we must continue to assume that humans have free will
even if determinism obtains.175 Regardless of how scientifically plausible the
incompatibilist argument may seem, we should not assume that we lack free will,
for doing so would jeopardize the reactive attitudes and, thus, the kind of
interpersonal relationships that are essential to our lives.176
E. Semi-Compatibilism
John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza advanced a highly influential solution
to the free will problem that they dubbed “semicompatibilism.”177
Semicompatibilism accepts as plausible the view that free will requires access to
alternative possibilities and that causal determinism is incompatible with free will
because it negates access to such alternative possibilities.178 Nevertheless,
semicompatibilists believe that moral responsibility does not require access to
alternative possibilities and is thus compatible with causal determinism.179 The gist
of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory is that a person acts in a morally responsible way
if her conduct is responsive to reason.180 Under this account, compulsives and the
mentally ill often do not act in a morally responsible manner because they are not
169
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responsive to the sort of rational considerations that guide the conduct of the
majority of humans. Furthermore, Fischer and Ravizza contend that an individual
is morally responsible for her conduct only if her action is triggered by a decision
or volition that can be properly characterized as belonging to the agent.181 Thus,
ascriptions of moral responsibility are warranted in cases where the behavior in
question was caused by the actor’s own reason-responsive process of deliberation,
as opposed to it being caused by a non-reason-responsive decisional process (the
mentally ill) or a reason-responsive deliberative process that does not belong to the
agent (thought processes induced by hypnosis).182 Finally, Fischer and Ravizza
argue that these attributions of moral responsibility are justified even if causal
determinism obtains because determinism is compatible with the view that human
conduct can be caused by the actor’s reason-responsive thought processes.
IV. FREE WILL IN CRIMINAL THEORY
As Part II of this Article demonstrates, courts and commentators traditionally
view free will as essential to criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, many, if not
most, criminal theorists have little to say about whether our practices of blaming
and punishing are undermined by the thesis of causal determinism. Of the few
criminal law scholars who discuss the free will problem, most espouse views that
mirror the theories of free will and moral responsibility discussed in Part III. Thus,
some criminal theorists, like George Fletcher, defend a libertarian account of free
will.183 Others, like Michael Moore, Stephen Morse, and most continental criminal
scholars, defend a compatibilist account of free will.184 Larry Alexander, for his
part, mysteriously declares himself to be agnostic with regard to the existence of
free will and its compatibility with causal determinism. Curiously, though some
scholars such as Anders Kaye have flirted with hard incompatibilist accounts of
free will,185 no criminal theorist has comprehensively defended the view that
causal determinism is likely true and that it is incompatible with free will and
moral responsibility. This Part seeks to explain, in more detail, the way these and
other criminal theorists have approached the free will problem.
A. George Fletcher’s Chomskyan-Inspired Libertarianism
Distinguished criminal law scholar George Fletcher bravely tackled the free
will problem in his recently published Grammar of Criminal Law.186 The problem
is discussed in the context of analyzing the nature and scope of the criminal law’s
181
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act requirement.187 According to Fletcher, the relevance of free will to criminal law
is that conduct satisfies the act requirement if, and only if, it is the product of the
effort or determination of the actor.188 As Fletcher correctly points out, it is
difficult to defend this way of construing the act requirement if the thesis of causal
determinism turns out to be true.189 Fletcher appears to be quite troubled by this
problem, given that conduct is not really the product of the actor’s effort or
determination if it is fully caused by the interplay of past events and the operation
of natural laws. Therefore, Fletcher appears to believe that criminal responsibility
is incompatible with causal determinism. He thus attempts to solve the free will
problem by arguing that causal determinism is false, at least insofar as it purports
to explain the inner workings of human behavior.190
Fletcher advances two arguments that he believes undermine the thesis of
causal determinism. First, relying on Noam Chomsky’s theory of language,
Fletcher argues that the number of sentences that we command in natural language
is infinite.191 This leads him to conclude that human beings could not be
predetermined or programmed to invent and understand new phrases because the
number of phrases that could be invented are infinite and thus cannot be
determined or programmed ex ante.192 Fletcher’s second argument is based on
John Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument.193 The Chinese Room argument
asks us to imagine a person inside a room with a set of instructions in English that
allow him to coherently answer questions posed to him in Chinese although he
does not read or understand Chinese.194 Properly understood, the argument is
supposed to show that computers that follow algorithms, much like the person
inside the Chinese room, cannot possibly understand the meaning of the answers it
provides to the problems with which it is posed.195 Fletcher believes that the
Chinese room argument casts doubt on the plausibility of the thesis of causal
determinism because it shows that it cannot be determined in advance that human
beings understand the meaning of language, because Searle demonstrates that no
computer could be programmed in advanced to achieve this feat.196 This leads
Fletcher to conclude that actors are endowed with free will because human conduct
is unprogrammed, infinitely variable, and thus not causally determined.197
187
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B. Compatibilism in Criminal Theory
1. Stephen Morse and Michael Moore’s Compatibilism
Stephen Morse is one of only a handful of criminal theorists that have
seriously tackled the free will problem. His views have proved to be quite
influential amongst criminal scholars. Morse, unlike Fletcher, believes that causal
determinism does not threaten free will and criminal responsibility.198 Morse also
disagrees with Fletcher regarding the plausibility of the thesis of causal
determinism. While Fletcher believes that causal determinism is likely to be false,
Morse believes that causal determinism is probably true.199 Nevertheless, Morse
argues that the sort of free will that is essential to moral responsibility is
compatible with determinism.200 Thus, he defends a compatibilist account of free
will. Furthermore, Morse argues that most of the criminal law doctrines that are
currently in place can be recast in compatibilist terms without effecting major
changes in criminal law jurisprudence.201
Morse’s compatibilist views closely resemble those espoused by philosopher
Daniel Dennett. Dennett argues that the sort of freedom that undergirds our
practices of blaming consists in the ability to give reasons in favor and against
engaging in a certain conduct.202 Similarly, Morse suggests that the freedom that is
required by moral responsibility “is dependent primarily on the agent’s general
capacity to grasp and be guided by reason.”203 Therefore, Morse believes that an
actor is morally responsible for his choices as long as he has the capacity to be
guided by reason. Contrarily, he considers that an actor is not responsible if her
capacity to be guided by reasons is diminished or nonexistent.204 According to
Morse, the advantage of his account is that it allows us to continue holding people
morally responsible for their conduct even if it turns out that determinism is true.
The fact that everything that takes place in the universe is causally determined
does not impinge upon the uniquely human capacity to rationally mull over our
choices and plan our conduct accordingly. Thus, Morse suggests that the sort of
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considerations that undergird his conception of free will, are unaffected by the
possible truth of determinism.205
Like Stephen Morse, distinguished criminal theorist Michael Moore believes
that the sort of free will that undergirds our judgments of praise and blame is
compatible with determinism.206 Moore begins his defense of compatibilism by
pointing out that actors should be held responsible for their conduct even if the
conduct has been caused by factors that the actor does not control—contrary to
what some criminal scholars have argued.207 He thus suggests that responsibility
does not hinge on being free from causal processes.208 Rather, he argues that we
ought to excuse certain conduct whenever it is performed under compulsion.209
Compulsion differs from causation in that compulsion interferes with one’s
ability to do what is required by reason and morality, whereas causation produces
conduct without interfering with the actor’s ability for practical reasoning.210
Compulsion can be internal, such as a schizophrenic’s compulsion to kill his
daughter in order to satisfy the will of the voices he hears inside his head. Or it can
be external, such as when an actor feels compelled to comply with the unlawful
demands of a gun-wielding assailant in order to keep himself free from harm.
Moore then suggests that actors are morally responsible for their acts as long as
they are not the product of compulsion, even if forces that actors cannot control
cause the acts.211 At first glance, this account of moral responsibility is compatible
with the truth of causal determinism, because responsibility would depend on the
absence of compulsion rather than on the absence of causation.
Although Moore places much emphasis on the distinction between causation
and compulsion, he acknowledges that the distinction is not in and of itself enough
to disprove the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism.
More specifically, Moore admits that there is a strong intuition that an actor is
responsible only if he could have acted otherwise and that the truth of causal
determinism calls into question whether humans actually have this ability.212
Moore’s response to this objection borrows much from Strawson’s “reactive
attitudes” account of compatibilism.213 Moore agrees with Strawson’s contention
that reactive attitudes such as blame, praise, resentment, and gratitude are an
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essential part of the human experience.214 These attitudes are so essential to our
lives that they give meaning to most of our valuable interpersonal relationships,
including those that we have with our children and friends.215 Furthermore, Moore
believes that reactive attitudes play an important role in guiding our behavior.216
Forsaking such attitudes would thus lead to falsifying much of our moral life. As a
result, Moore contends that we should not renounce to the sort of free will that
makes experiencing these attitudes possible, even if it turns out that the thesis of
causal determinism is true.217
2. Compatibilism in Continental Criminal Theory
Like their Anglo-American counterparts, many continental criminal law
scholars acknowledge that the plausibility of the thesis of causal determinism
threatens to undermine the kind of freedom that undergirds conventional theories
of criminal responsibility. Claus Roxin—one of Europe’s leading criminal
theorists—believes that he has found a way out of the free will problem. Roxin
argues that an individual acts freely, and is thus morally and criminally liable,
when he is in a position to understand and take into account the applicable legal
rules that are intended to govern his conduct.218 Furthermore, he argues that we
ought to assume—without being able to prove—that the individual who is in such
a position is also able to conform his conduct to the mandates of the law.219 This,
however, does not mean that Roxin argues for an indeterminist account of freedom
of will and responsibility.220 As a matter of fact, Roxin believes that his view is
compatible with determinist accounts of human conduct.221 More specifically, he
suggests that whether humans are capable of acting otherwise is irrelevant to his
views on freedom and responsibility because actors who are capable of
understanding and taking into account applicable legal rules are treated as if they
were free to act otherwise, regardless of whether they were actually capable of
doing so.222 Thus, Roxin contends that assuming that humans are endowed with the
freedom to choose amongst alternative courses of action is socially valuable
regardless of whether epistemological or scientific inquiry casts doubt on whether
such a faculty actually exists.223
Another compatibilist account of free will, influential amongst continental
criminal theorists, is the one advanced by Gunther Jakobs. Jakobs’ compatibilist
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argument shares several important features with Daniel Dennett’s compatibilism.
Jakobs, like Dennett, believes that the usefulness of certain concepts depends on
their effectiveness in explaining, understanding, and predicting the behavior of a
given system.224 More specifically, Jakobs argues that free will is relevant to
responsibility only insofar as it is practical and useful for law and society to
presuppose that humans are free in a special sort of way.225 Jakobs then posits that
the freedom to be unencumbered from causal processes is not essential to our
judgments about blame and responsibility.226 However, he argues that being free
from extraordinary causal influences, such as serious human threats and mental
defects is essential to our practices of blaming and punishing.227 Therefore, he
suggests that judgments about moral responsibility are dependent on being free
from certain compulsions, but not dependent on being free from causal
processes.228 As a result, Jakobs concludes that the sort of free will that is relevant
to moral responsibility is not threatened by the truth of causal determinism.229
C. Agnostic Stances Toward the Problem of Free Will in Criminal Law
In a recently published book, Larry Alexander seems to reject the
compatibilist solution to the free will problem in favor of what seems to be an
agnostic stance with regard to the issue. More specifically, he claims that
“compatibilism provides only a hollow form of moral responsibility, not the fullblooded form that our reactive attitudes assume.”230 What Alexander finds
particularly troubling about the compatibilism advocated by scholars like Morse
and Dennett is that, if determinism obtains, it would seem that what appears to the
actor to be a “reason” for engaging in a certain act is actually caused by forces that
the actor cannot control.231 He contends, “we are incapable of resolving” the “free
224
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will-determinism puzzle” and that the specter of determinism “will always dog
[our] practices of holding people morally responsible.”232 However, he believes
that “we cannot imagine dispensing with” our practices of blaming and
punishing.233 Given that we cannot live without such practices, he concludes “a
retributivist regarding criminal punishment need not resolve or even take sides on
the free will issue.”234 Alexander then summarizes his position by claiming in a
somewhat mysterious fashion that “we cannot . . . comprehend the bases of moral
responsibility” because “neither determinism nor indeterminism can provide a
satisfactory account of moral responsibility, and together they appear to exhaust
the possibilities.”235 Nevertheless, he posits that we cannot renounce to judgments
about blame and praise because “we cannot comprehend the possibility that we are
not morally responsible.”236
In his book on the philosophy of criminal law, Douglas Husak also seems to
adopt an agnostic stance to the free will problem. There, Husak argues that the gist
of the criminal law’s act requirement cannot mean that an actor should only be
held liable for engaging in “acts.”237 The act requirement, Husak suggests, cannot
stand for this proposition because actors are routinely held liable for non-acts such
as omissions and for certain states of affairs such as public drunkenness.238
Therefore, he claims that what the criminal law’s act requirement really means is
that it is unfair to hold an actor liable for acts, results, or states of affair that he
cannot control.239 Husak thus contends that the criminal law should abandon the
act requirement in favor of what he calls the “control principle.”240 One obvious
objection to Husak’s control principle is that if determinism obtains, an actor
should never be held liable for anything, given that in a causally determined world
human behavior is ultimately caused by factors over which the individual lacks
control. To his credit, Husak acknowledges the problem in his book.241
Nevertheless, he ends up dismissing the problem by asserting “though perhaps
disappointingly little is said here” about how determinism might undermine the
control principle, “I hope that the notion of control is able to withstand the great
intuitive weight I place upon it.” 242
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D. Hard Incompatibilism and Criminal Theory
For reasons that remain unclear, hard incompatibilism has barely found its
way into the writings of contemporary criminal scholars. Only Michael Corrado
has expressly endorsed the hard incompatibilist position, although he has yet to
comprehensively defend his position against the attacks leveled by compatibilists
and libertarians.243 Additionally, a handful of criminal theorists defend a particular
account of excuse defenses that is influenced by some of the arguments that hard
incompatibilists often advance. This account is known as the “causal theory of
excuses.”244 According to the causal theory of excuses, a defendant ought to be
excused for engaging in wrongful conduct if his conduct was caused by factors
outside the actor’s control.245 This view stems from two deeply held intuitions.
First, it assumes that it is intuitively unfair to blame an actor for acts that are not
“up to him.” Second, it assumes that it is unjust to blame an actor for performing a
certain act if he lacked the capacity to do otherwise.
Supporters of the causal theory of excuses have a tough time accepting the
implications that causal determinism would have for their theory. As has been
mentioned, the truth of causal determinism means that human conduct is caused by
the combination of natural laws and events that have taken place in the past.246
Humans lack control over both natural laws and the past. Therefore, the truth of
causal determinism inevitably leads to the conclusion that human conduct is the
product of factors over which we lack control. Given that defenders of the causal
theory of excuses believe that conduct caused by factors the actor cannot control
should not be punished, the truth of causal determinism should lead them to reject
free will and with it the practice of blaming people for their evil acts.247 Causal
theorists have resisted the implications of this argument. Most, like Anders Kaye,
have done so by refusing to fully accept the thesis of causal determinism.248 Kaye’s
position is inspired, at least in part, by the plausibility of certain libertarian
accounts of human behavior249 and, therefore, his approach to determinism appears
to be a brand of libertarianism cloaked in (partial) determinist clothing.
243
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V. THE FREE WILL MAZE AS A DIALECTICAL STALEMATE AND WHERE WE GO
FROM HERE
As we have seen, philosophers and criminal theorists have come up with
different ways of tackling the free will problem. Both libertarians and hard
incompatibilists believe that causal determinism is incompatible with free will and
moral responsibility. Libertarians, however, believe that humans do in fact have
free will because human behavior can be traced back to indeterministic processes.
Hard incompatibilists, on the other hand, argue that humans lack free will and
moral responsibility even if human conduct is the product of indeterministic forces.
Compatibilists do not deny that causal determinism is plausible. However, unlike
hard incompatibilists and libertarians, they argue that free will is compatible with
determinism. Although each of these views has some appealing attributes,
important objections can be leveled against all three. The purpose of this Part is to
briefly examine various objections to each of these theories in order to assess the
current state of the free will debate and propose a way forward.
A. The Problems with Libertarianism
The most sophisticated account of libertarianism is the one defended by
Anders Kane who, in typical libertarian fashion, accepts that free will is
incompatible with determinism, but rejects the truth of causal determinism.250 The
challenge for Kane is to find a scientifically plausible account of human behavior
that can be traced back to indeterministic processes.251 While Kane’s Herculean
attempt to explain human conduct by appealing to indeterministic quantum
mechanic processes in the brain252 is creative, it raises two serious problems. First,
the indeterministic processes that undergird quantum mechanics are random.253
This is problematic, for it would be odd to conclude that it is fair to hold an
individual morally responsible for conduct that is ultimately the product of random
or haphazard events. Thus, random causation is as much a threat to freedom of will
and moral responsibility as determinism is.254 Second, and perhaps more
importantly, there is simply no scientific evidence supporting Kane’s account of
quantum mechanics in the brain. As Henrik Walter observes, “to date there is no
250
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solid empirical evidence that local quantum phenomena play a role in neurons,
[whereas] there are good arguments to the contrary.”255
The most recent criminal law theorist to defend libertarianism is George
Fletcher. Fletcher believes that Noam Chomsky’s showing that we command an
infinite number of sentences in natural language demonstrates that human conduct
is not causally determined.256 More specifically, he argues that it would be
impossible to program a computer to create terms the programmer has never heard
before and, therefore, it is unlikely that human beings could be determined to
invent new words in a language.257 However, Fletcher’s use of Chomsky as his
poster boy for indeterminism is particularly odd, because other philosophers
invoke Chomsky’s theory of language as an argument in favor of the so-called
computational theory of mind.258
According to the computational theory of mind, the best way of thinking
about the human mind is as an information processing system (i.e., a
computer)259 and the best way of thinking of the concept of thought is as a kind of
computation.260 Chomskyan linguistics lends credence to the computational theory
of mind because what accounts for the infinite variability of language that Fletcher
finds so interesting is the human capacity for “recursion.”261 Recursion is nothing
more than a particular type of computation that consists of taking discrete elements
(e.g., phrases) and recombining them in a way that can potentially yield infinite
combinations (e.g., infinite sentences).262 Of course, given that recursion is a kind
of computation, there would be nothing odd about a sufficiently powerful
computer that can recombine a discrete set of words and phrases in a way that
produces infinite utterances. Therefore, rather than demonstrating that human
language cannot be the product of computation or of some algorithmic program,
Chomskyan linguistics tend to show that the human capacity for language can be
reduced to a discrete set of rules that operate in recursive fashion to create an
infinite amount of utterances. As a result, contrary to what Fletcher suggests,
255
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Chomsky’s theory of language reinforces the thesis of causal determinism instead
of jeopardizing it.
Fletcher also believes that John Searle’s Chinese Room argument shows that
human conduct is likely not causally determined.263 Fletcher argues that “if the use
of language were determined by algorithms in the brain,” we would conduct
ourselves in much the same manner as the individual inside the Chinese Room and
would thus be unable to understand what we’re saying.264 Since we clearly
understand what we’re saying, it follows that we are not determined to act by
algorithms in the brain. The chief objection to Fletcher’s use of the Chinese Room
argument as a vehicle for demonstrating the falsity of determinism is that the
Searle’s argument is not designed to demonstrate that human conduct is not
causally determined. Searle devised the argument in order to show that computers,
unlike humans, are not capable of understanding meaning.265 Even if this
conclusion is accepted,266 it does not follow from the fact that humans are not
computers that human conduct is not causally determined. The basic flaw in
Fletcher’s argument is that it incorrectly assumes that all causally determined
beings take the form of a computer. Thus, as Stephen Morse correctly points out,
Fletcher’s argument ultimately fails because “[c]omputers are not the only
deterministic mechanisms on earth, and Fletcher fails to confront the possibility
that computer programs cannot fully simulate the capacity of natural selection to
develop new, nonmysterious and deterministic forms, such as brains capable of
understanding meaning.”267
B. The Problems with Compatibilism
1. Basic Objections to Standard Accounts of Compatibilisim Referred to as
“Mesh” and “Reactive Attitudes” Compatibilism
Frankfurt claims that the sort of free will that undergirds judgments of blame
and praise merely requires that there be an appropriate “mesh” or link between
certain inclinations and desires of the actor.268 More specifically, Frankfurt
suggests that an actor acts freely if his first and second order volitions are
connected in the right kind of way (i.e., the actor desires to desire eating the red
velvet cheesecake).269 This solution is elegant because it allows for the possibility
of free will and moral responsibility even if it turns out that we are causally
determined to act in a certain manner (to eat the red velvet cheesecake, for
263
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example). The problem with Frankfurt’s solution is that causal determinism
threatens not only the control humans have over their actions, but also the control
they have over their motives, intents, and desires.270 Therefore, if causal
determinism is true, it follows that the interplay of the past and natural laws
determines not only our conduct, but also our desires. Given that we lack control
over the past and the natural laws, it follows that if determinism obtains we would
lack control over both our conduct and our first, second, and Nth order volitions.
Once we accept that in a causally determined universe humans lack control over
both their conduct and their volitions, it is difficult to see why the actor’s volitions
make him responsible in a robust sense for what he does. As a result, mesh
accounts of compatibilism, like Frankfurt’s, do not seem to provide the sort of free
will that supports judgments of moral responsibility. Since an actor’s responsibility
seems to be a product not only of his capacity to act otherwise, but also of his
capacity to desire otherwise—both of these capacities are threatened by
determinism.
P.F. Strawson attempts to avoid objections to mesh theories of compatibilism
with this proposition: we must assume that humans are endowed with free will,
regardless of the truth of determinism, because not doing so would lead to
abandoning many reactive attitudes (regret, resentment, blame, praise, love, etc.)
that are essential to healthy interpersonal relationships.271 Strawson’s argument is
thus more normative than metaphysical.272 Ultimately, his claim is not that we
actually have such a thing as free will, but rather that human and societal life is
more appealing if we assume we have free will regardless of whether we actually
do have it.273 Certainly, Strawson is right that some reactive attitudes, such as the
kind of blame that undergirds theories of retribution, would have to be jettisoned if
we lack free will. However, it is unclear whether reactive attitudes are actually
essential to interpersonal relationships. Even if they are, it is unclear whether
assuming that we lack free will would jeopardize the reactive attitudes that are
most essential to human life. As will be discussed in Part VI of this article, we
270
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experience many of the most cherished reactive attitudes, including love,
admiration, and praise, regardless of whether we believe that the actor who is
loved, praised, or admired is endowed with free will.274 Thus, most of us would
continue loving our children, admiring Liz Taylor’s beautiful violet eyes, and
praising Ussain Bolt for running a hundred meters in less than 9.69 seconds, even
if we believed that our children have not yet developed the sort of character or
rationality that undergirds free will, that Liz Taylor did not freely choose to have
violet eyes, and that Ussain Bolt’s freakish speed is more a product of his genes
than his training. It is thus uncertain that Strawson is right when he claims that a
life without free will is not possible or desirable.
2. The Problems with Reasons-Centered Accounts of Compatibilism (and SemiCompatibilism)
As we have seen, semicompatibilists like John Martin Fischer believe that
determinism is incompatible with free will, while it is compatible with moral
responsibility.275 For Fischer, an actor is morally responsible if his conduct could
be guided by reasons, and the reasons that move him into action belong to him
rather than to another.276 The flaws with Fischer’s account of moral responsibility
are similar to the flaws inherent in Frankfurt’s mesh account of compatibilism. If
causal determinism is true, it follows that everything that happens in the world,
including human conduct, human desires, and a human’s responsiveness to
reasons is caused by factors over which he lacks control.277 It is unclear whether an
actor should be blamed or praised for engaging in conduct that is the product of a
reason-responsive process of deliberation when it is assumed that the very process
of deliberation was determined by factors over which the actor lacked control. It is
sensible to argue that an actor is morally responsible for his acts if, and only if, the
process of deliberation that caused his conduct originated in the actor rather than in
some causal force over which the actor has no control.278 In other words, it is
reasonable to assume that an actor is morally responsible for his conduct only if he
was in control of the deliberative process that caused him to act. Determinism
implies that actors do not control the deliberative processes that generate their
conduct. Thus, it may be argued that the question of whether the actor is in fact
responsive to reasons in a particular case lacks the moral significance that Fischer
attaches to it, because the actor does not control the deliberative process.
Like Fischer, compatibilist criminal theorists believe that if an actor has the
capacity for rationality, then he also has the sort of free will that undergirds
judgments of blame and praise.279 These arguments can be criticized on the same
274
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grounds that are employed on Fischer’s semicompatibilism arguments.280 Moore
and Morse, however, attempt to sidestep these objections by deploying a reductio
ad absurdum argument. They argue that if humans can only be blamed for conduct
that is the product of factors that they control, then it follows that humans can
never be blamed for anything, given that causal determinism implies that all
human conduct is the product of forces that we cannot control.281 And they claim it
would be unpalatable to conclude that everyone ought to be excused for their
transgressions.282 The problem with this sort of maneuver is that, like Strawson’s
reactive attitudes compatibilism, it presupposes that if we lack the capacity to be
held morally responsible for our acts, this leads to an impoverished view of
societal life that would “falsify much of our moral li[ves.]”283 Moore and Morse
(and Strawson) overstate their case, because (as argued previously) it is not clear
that assuming a lack of free will would lead to the sort of life that is not worth
living. Furthermore, accepting that everyone ought to be “excused” from
wrongdoing in a retributive sense does not entail that no one ought to be
“punished” or “incarcerated.” As will be discussed in Part VII, there are good
consequentialist reasons to punish or incarcerate people even if they do not
“deserve” to suffer in the sense that Morse and Moore imply.
3. The Problems with Pragmatic or Functionalist Accounts of Compatibilism
Daniel Dennett and Gunther Jakobs argue that it is useful to talk about
concepts like free will only if doing so helps us better understand and explain the
behavior of a particular being or entity.284 Thus, we ought to abstain from talking
about the free will of ants or rocks because there is nothing to gain in terms of
explanatory and predictive power. However, it is perfectly sensible and rational to
talk about the free will of humans, because doing so helps us to better understand
societal practices of blaming and punishing and the way in which humans interact
with each other.285 This approach to free will and moral responsibility views the
problem of free will as a pragmatic one that should not be obfuscated by asking
unanswerable metaphysical questions, such as whether humans actually have free
will. Ultimately, it is unimportant whether humans have metaphysical free will;
what really matters is whether there is something to gain by assuming that they are,
in fact, endowed with free will.286
280
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The problem with this argument is that many people do in fact care about
whether we actually have the ability to control our conduct and the desires and
reasons that shape our behavior. For those who do care about this sort of thing,
determinism threatens to undermine free will and moral responsibility. Whether it
would be efficient or pragmatic to ignore this is irrelevant. While there may be
something to be gained from adopting a pragmatic approach to questions related to
free will, those who believe that judgments of blame are unjust if humans do not
have actual access to alternate possibilities will not change their minds simply
because it would be efficient to presume that they do have the capacity to choose
amongst alternative courses of action.
C. The Problems with Hard Incompatibilism
Many hard incompatibilists believe both that determinism is true and that it is
incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. This kind of hard
incompatibilism can be challenged on two fronts. First, it is unclear whether causal
determinism fully explains human behavior. It is true that there are scientific
experiments that suggest that human conduct is causally determined by factors
over which we lack control,287 but it is also true that these experiments are limited
in their scope and the precise way in which the mind works is still very much
unknown.288 Furthermore, even if it is accepted for argument’s sake that
determinism is true, it is possible that the sort of freedom that is essential for moral
responsibility is compatible with a deterministic understanding of the universe and
of human behavior. If there are, as many philosophers and legal scholars seem to
believe, accounts of human conduct that are compatible both with determinism and
with ascriptions of blame and praise, why hijack the free will edifice upon which
our practices of blaming and punishing are built, simply because it is not
incoherent to hold that determinism is incompatible with free will and moral
responsibility? After all, as Stephen Morse suggests, we may have good reason to
reject hard incompatibilism “[if] compatibilism is consistent with our
responsibility practices and their centrality, and [if] there is [not] and cannot be any
incontrovertible theoretical or empirical reason to reject it . . . . ”289 Thus, although
“there may be good empirical and normative reasons to reform various
responsibility doctrines and practices . . . there is no metaphysical reason
concerning free will to abandon them entirely.”290
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D. The Free Will Problem as a Dialectical Stalemate
This brief survey of the proposed solutions to the free will problem—and the
objections that can be leveled at the different solutions—demonstrates at least
three things. First, causal determinism threatens to undermine free will and
proponents of free will (libertarians) thus need to put forth a theory that can
explain either why free will is compatible with determinism or why determinism is
likely false. Second, some theorists (compatibilists) have in fact come up with
plausible theories that purport to demonstrate how free will and determinism can
coexist, whereas others (libertarians) have come up with plausible theories that
explain why determinism might be false. Third, serious objections can be directed
both at the incompatibilist (including libertarian and hard incompatibilist theories)
and compatibilist solutions to the free will problem. As a result, it seems that the
free will problem has the argumentative structure John Martin Fischer called a
“dialectical stalemate.”291
The seeds of a dialectical stalemate are planted whenever someone puts forth
a controversial claim and supports his argument by “invoking a set of examples (or
other considerations)” that demonstrate that his claim ought to be accepted.292 The
dialectical stalemate germinates when an opponent reasonably asserts that one
could “embrace all the examples” (and other considerations) in the proponent’s
argument without having to accept the proponent’s claim.293 Thus, as Hillary Bok
explains, we have reached a dialectical stalemate
when no arguments based on appeals to ordinary language, to the
consideration of examples, or to our intuitions succeed in convincing our
opponents, and when this is due not to our opponents’ limitations but to
the fact that both sides can appeal to intuitions, accounts of apparent
counterexamples, and claims about our ordinary use of the terms in
question that are not unreasonable.294
Once the notion of a dialectical stalemate is grasped, it is easy to see why the
free will problem presents the “signature structure” of such argumentative
deadlocks.295 Libertarians and hard incompatibilists share the intuition that an actor
lacks the free will that calls for moral responsibility, and the intuition that
determinism implies that humans lack control over their actions. Compatibilists
reply in one of two ways. Some offer the competing intuition that in many cases
moral responsibility is grounded on something other than the capacity to control
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actions, such as the appropriate connection between the actor’s first and second
order volitions.296
Others argue that even if determinism obtains, humans can act otherwise—for
any given actor could act otherwise if he wants to, because even if determinism is
true, an actor’s desires do exert causal force over the actor’s conduct.297 Therefore,
as Hillary Bok points out,
both [incompatibilists] and compatibilists draw on important features of
our ordinary concept of freedom, both are trying to apply that concept to
cases in which the conditions of its straightforward application are
absent, both project that concept in ways that are not obviously
unreasonable or illegitimate, and both can muster real intuitive support
for their views.298
Consequently, the free will problem presents a genuine dialectical stalemate, given
that “no appeal to our ordinary concept of freedom, or to the ways in which we
ordinarily apply it, will settle the issue between [incompatibilists] and
compatibilists, since that concept supports both views and does not give us
decisive grounds to reject either.”299 More importantly, if the problem of free will
truly generates this dialectical stalemate, incompatibilists and compatibilists should
agree that both solutions to the free will problem “have something to be said for
them [and] can usefully be employed in various circumstances.”300 They should
also agree that neither claim is likely “to be established by arguments about what
[ordinary terms mean], by appeal to our ordinary concept of freedom or by our
intuitions.”301
E. The Way Out of the Dialectical Stalemate Generated by the Free Will Problem
What should criminal scholars do in light of this dialectical stalemate? We
could throw our hands up in despair and candidly acknowledge, as Larry
Alexander has, that the free will problem is intractable and one that “we are
incapable of resolving.”302 This strikes me as the wrong way to respond to a
dialectical stalemate. As John Martin Fischer has persuasively argued, these
stalemates should not issue in “philosophical despair,” nor should they “result in
our inability to make any philosophical progress or to come to any useful
296
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philosophical conclusions.”303 When faced with these stalemates, we should
“abandon the attempt to convince our opponents that intuitions, examples, or
ordinary language decisively favor our view, not only because such arguments are
unlikely to convince them[,] but because the fact that we have reached a genuine
dialectical stalemate shows that such arguments are unsound.”304 And we should
“admit that there are several apparently legitimate ways” of solving the problem
and that each of these solutions is prima facie plausible.305 Once we do so, we
ought to stop focusing on whether free will really or actually means this or that, or
whether moral responsibility does or does not presuppose access to alternative
possibilities. Rather, we should ask ourselves whether we have better normative
reasons for adopting the compatibilist over the incompatibilist stance or vice versa.
In other words, the best way out of the dialectical stalemate is not by
considering which of the competing accounts of free will is closer to the
metaphysical truth of the matter (because we simply do not know what the truth of
this matter is), but rather by considering the normative question related to which of
these competing conceptions of freedom and moral responsibility produces a more
appealing life in general and a more desirable criminal law in particular.
VI. WHY LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL IS NOT AS BAD AS IT SEEMS
Before deciding whether there are good normative reasons for us to hold on
toor abandonfree will, we first need to envision what a world without free will
would look like. Would we want to live in such a world or would we rather live in
a world in which we assume that others are endowed with free will? For most of
the philosophers and criminal theorists who have confronted the question, the
answer seems obvious. A life without free will is like a garden without flowers.
Assuming that our fellow humans lack free will and the capacity to be held morally
responsible for their acts leads to an impoverished view of human life.306 The
purpose of this Part is to show that this conventional account of what a world
without free will would look like is wrong in very significant ways. It seems that
these bleak assessments of the consequences of assuming that we have no free will
are driven by the philosopher’s desperate desire to hang on to the free will edifice
that we have built over thousands of years. Ultimately, however, this Part claims
that the normative case against free will is overstated, that there is no need to fear
living in a world without free will, and that assuming that humans lack free will
can actually have salutary consequences in some cases.
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A. The Conventional Claim: Living Without Free Will Is Utterly Unappealing
1. Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes Argument
P.F. Strawson argues that we ought to assume that humans are endowed with
free will because to do the opposite undermines the reactive attitudes.307 As
discussed earlier, reactive attitudes are attitudes that are important in defining and
maintaining our interpersonal and societal relationships.308 For Strawson, a life
lived without reactive attitudes is barely a life worth living.309 After all, what
would a life be without receiving praise for doing well and blaming those who do
badly? What would a life be without being able to love those who are good to us
and resent those who are mean to us? The answer is clear to Strawson: living such
a life is unpalatable and ought to be avoided at all costs.310 If the price of not
falling prey to such a life is to assume that we have free will in the face of causal
determinism, so be it.
Strawson believes that assuming that we do not have free will jeopardizes not
only the enjoyment of individual lives, but also the wellbeing of society as a
whole.311 Reactive attitudes are thought to be essential to justifying many societal
practices. Perhaps the most obvious practices that are justified on the basis of
certain reactive attitudes are practices of blaming and punishing.312 Religious
practices also seem to be undergirded by certain reactive attitudes. Judgments of
blame and praise play an essential role in Judeo-Christian religions. For example,
for the Judeo-Christian tradition, a person who unjustifiably violates one of the
Ten Commandments behaves in a blameworthy manner. Desert-based judgments
are thus essential to understanding certain basic aspects of these religions.
Furthermore, even more mundane practices, such as governmental awarding of
“merit scholarships” and public recognition of achievements by way of prizes and
awards, seem to lose meaning in a world without free will. After all, if there is no
free will, what’s the point of rewarding people for doing what they could not have
abstained from doing? By the same token, if there is no free will, what’s the point
of blaming people for doing things that they could not have done differently?
Strawson argues that these practices would be pointless if we assume that there is
no free will and this, in turn, provides us with a normative argument against hard
incompatibilist approaches to the free will problem.313
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2. Michael Moore’s “Falsifying Our Moral Life” Argument
Michael Moore has also assessed the normative implications of assuming that
humans lack free will.314 For him, the problem with denying free will is that doing
so is inconsistent with our practices of blaming and punishing, praising, and
rewarding. Like Strawson, Moore claims that our practices of blaming and praising
are essential to moral life.315 Without assuming that we are endowed with the sort
of freedom that undergirds such practices we could not do things that we would
like to do, such as praising (or blaming) Andy Warhol for immortalizing Campbell
Soup cans in a work of art or commending Michael Moore for writing an excellent
article about free will. Moore finds it hard to imagine what our practices of
praising and blaming would look like if we assume that humans lack free will,
although it seems obvious that he believes that such practices would be much less
appealing if we were to make this assumption. While Moore concedes that the hard
incompatibilist might adopt a “tough it out” attitude and claim that most of our
moral experience is false in light of the truth of causal determinism, he believes
that we have good reasons to avoid doing this.316 Moore proposes that the hard
incompatibilist position ought to be rejected, not because it can be proven false,
but rather because it cannot be proven true and he asks if the implications of
accepting the position would “falsify much of our moral life.”317 As a result,
Moore concludes that we ought to reject hard incompatibilism and accept
compatibilism.
3. The Attitudes that Must Be Abandoned in a World Without Free Will Are Not
Essential to Maintaining Healthy Relationships
Strawson is probably right when he claims that some attitudes would have to
be abandoned in a world without free will. He is also right when he claims, along
with Moore, that it would no longer make sense to genuinely blame those who
engage in wrongdoing and praise those who engage in morally commendable
behavior. Nevertheless, Strawson overstates his case when he suggests that living
without such attitudes is unpalatable or that the absence of such reactive attitudes
is detrimental to societal life. Similarly, Moore exaggerates when he proposes that
the loss of certain attitudes, such as blame, would “falsify much of our moral
li[ves].”318 While Strawson and Moore argue that feelings of blame are healthy
both at individual and collective scales, there are good reasons to believe
otherwise. Blame usually engenders resentment and indignation, which, in turn,
might generate a strong desire for vengeance and an unrelenting quest for
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revenge.319 While perhaps feelings of blame are not objectionable per se, there are
many good reasons to object to vengeance and revenge. Vengeance and revenge
are viewed as “angry” responses to crime that are derived more from a “lust for
blood” than from a rational and careful consideration of the pros and cons of
punishing the individual.320 Thus, abandoning feelings of blame might lead to a
less vengeful and violent society, which, of course, would be a salutary
development.
It is also important to note that many of our most fulfilling relationships are
entirely devoid of feelings of blame. Most people love to interact with children
despite the fact that they cannot be genuinely blamed or praised for doing what
they do.321 Not only that, but it would seem that we prize such interactions at least
in part precisely because we can easily shrug off transgressions committed by
children by simply assuming that they could not do otherwise. Far from reducing
the value of our experiences with children, this actually allows us to enjoy our time
with them more, for we feel free to love children without judging them.
Similarly, most people cherish their pets although animals are clearly
incapable of free will and thus of being genuinely responsible for their acts. In
spite of this, we love spending time with our dogs and cats and very much
appreciate their displays of affection and disregard their transgressions without
caring about whether they can be genuinely praised for curling next to us or
blamed for biting our leg. Thus, it is undoubtedly the case that experiencing
“genuine” feelings of blame and praise is not a prerequisite to having fulfilling and
meaningful relationships with others. When this is combined with the fact that
feelings of blame can and often do degenerate in unhealthy desires for vengeance
and revenge, Strawson and Moore’s conclusion that blame is essential to a life
worth living seems far from compelling.
There are, of course, certain attitudes that could not be abandoned without
dealing a fatal blow to some of the most cherished experiences in human life. The
obvious example is love. It is difficult to imagine what a world not capable of
loving would look like. Strawson seems to suggest that even our feelings of love
would be threatened if we were to assume that we lack free will.322 Once again, it
seems that Strawson overstates his case. As was discussed in the preceding
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paragraph, we love children and pets although we accept that they lack free will.323
Furthermore, we would continue to love our children even if scientists demonstrate
beyond a reasonable doubt that our love for them is entirely hardwired into our
brains. By the same token, we would continue to love our parents, spouses, and
friends even if someone showed us that we did not freely choose to love them or
that they did not they freely choose to love us in return.324
Feelings of admiration are also very important to the human experience. It
would be a bleak life indeed if no one would ever acknowledge our
accomplishments. Moore believes that just like there is no room for blame, there is
no space for praise in a world without free will.325 Although it is unclear whether
we must stop praising people if we assume that we lack free will, it is manifestly
clear that we need not stop admiring them. We admired Liz Taylor’s violet eyes—
and she undoubtedly enjoyed such admiration—although we were aware that she
did not freely choose the coloration of her iris. Similarly, we admire the Grammy
award winning singer Adele’s incredible voice even though we know that her
vocal abilities are innate. Furthermore, we would continue to admire Ussain Bolt
for being the fastest person on earth and to complement Michael Moore for his
enormous contributions to legal theory even if we believed that they are able to do
what they do only because they were lucky to have been born with certain physical
and intellectual attributes. In sum, it appears that we often seek admiration and that
we can admire humans for their traits and acts regardless of whether they have the
ability to control their traits or acts.
4. The Existence and Usefulness of Morality Is Not Threatened by Assuming that
We Lack Free Will
Another argument against the hard incompatibilist position is that its adoption
might lead to eschewing moral judgments. This is an important objection. Moral
rules are a fundamental feature of societal life. A theory that leads to the rejection
of morality thus fails to make sense of an essential facet of our lives. This
argument against hard incompatibilism exploits a perceived connection between
judgments about blame and judgments about morality. The point of departure of
the argument is that if humans lack free will they cannot be genuinely blamed for
their acts. The next step is to argue that judgments about the morality of engaging
in certain acts are devoid of meaning if one accepts the proposition that ascriptions
of blame for engaging in these acts are unwarranted. After all, if it does not make
sense to blame an actor for doing “X,” is it not also the case that it does not make
sense to conclude that the actor behaved immorally when doing “X”?
Despite its intuitive appeal, this argument ought to be rejected because it fails
to distinguish between two very different rules. More specifically, the argument
323
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conflates rules that govern the attribution of culpability with rules that proscribe
wrongful conduct. Failing to distinguish between these two kinds of rules is
problematic, given that it is possible to have wrongdoing without culpability. An
act is wrongful if it is prohibited by a given system of norms (moral, legal,
religious, and so forth).326 On the other hand, an actor has culpability if he deserves
blame for engaging in the admittedly wrongful conduct.327 The foundational rules
of morality (do not kill, do not steal, and so forth) are rules that proscribe
wrongdoing rather than rules that gauge the actor’s culpability. Judgments about
the morality of engaging in certain conduct are thus independent from judgments
about whether an actor should be blamed for engaging in an immoral act.328 A case
in which judgments of wrongdoing are divorced from judgments of blame is that
of insane killings, where killing an innocent human being is deemed wrongful even
where the actor is ultimately excused because he cannot be fairly blamed for the
killing.329
The distinction between wrongdoing and blameworthiness also helps to make
sense of certain important features of tort law. As any first-year law student knows,
children and the insane are held liable for their torts even though their conduct is
not usually considered blameworthy for the purposes of the criminal law.330
Therefore, as far as tort law is concerned, the wrongfulness of certain conduct is
determined solely by the fact that the act unjustifiably infringes a rule of the
system regardless of whether the infraction is blameworthy.331 Harming an
innocent human being is morally and legally wrongful, even when the person who
causes the harm is a minor or is insane. Once the independent moral significance
of wrongdoing is grasped, it becomes clear why acceptance of the hard
incompatibilist position does not lead to the rejection of morality. The foundational
rules of morality proscribe engaging in wrongful conduct but have little to say
about how and when judgments of blame are warranted. The hard incompatibilist
position is in tension with the practice of blaming others for their conduct, but is
compatible with the practice of proscribing wrongful conduct. Therefore, hard
incompatibilism can be embraced without jettisoning morality.
326
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A related objection must also be confronted. Can we identify coherent rules of
morality if we assume that we lack free will? It seems that we can, at least if we
adopt a consequentialist approach to morality.332 According to consequentialism,
the morally correct course of conduct is that which maximizes good
consequences.333 We adopt consequentialist rules in order to influence the behavior
of the addressees of the legal rules.334 Given that humans are capable of
understanding moral rules, their conduct is likely to be shaped in some way by the
existence of such rules. It is important to note for our purposes that humans
possess the capacity to learn and understand rules even if causal determinism
obtains and it is deemed to be incompatible with the sort of freedom that
undergirds judgments about moral responsibility. As a result, while the hard
incompatibilist must concede that her position undermines judgments about blame
and about attributing moral responsibility, she is in no way committed to accepting
that her position is incompatible with the existence or potential usefulness of moral
rules.
5. Why Assuming that We Lack Free Will May Be Good for Us
These brief reflections reveal that assuming we lack free will does not drain
life of all its beauties and does not deprive us of having healthy and fulfilling
interpersonal relationships. While this assumption leads to modifying some aspects
of our lives, there is no reason to believe that these modifications would lead to an
utterly unappealing conception of life. It might even be the case that the opposite is
true. Perhaps our life is made more appealing by assuming that humans are not
endowed with the sort of freedom that makes them genuinely responsible for their
acts. For one, adopting this attitude would inevitably lead to more compassion and
understanding towards those who commit transgressions against us. If I truly
believe that the person who stole my car is not to blame for his crime, then my
reactions to his transgression will likely change from an initial feeling of
indignation and resentment, to feelings of understanding and compassion; after all,
he is no more to blame for his act than small children are to blame for their
conduct or nature is to blame for natural disasters. Assuming that humans lack free
will could thus lead to transforming most feelings of resentment and indignation
into feelings of compassion and understanding. Living in a world without free will
may very well turn out to be quite an appealing prospect.
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VII. PUNISHING WITHOUT FREE WILL
Even if it is possible to live a fulfilling life without free will, could we still
have a functioning and desirable system of criminal justice without free will? Once
again, the conventionally accepted answer is that a system of criminal law without
free will is likely to be unappealing. The starting point for this argument is that
abandoning free will entails abandoning blame. Given that placing blame is an
important feature of our current practices of punishment, it may appear that
eliminating free will would deal a fatal blow to criminal law. These concerns are
overblown. While dispensing with free will means that retributive theories of
criminal justice must be abandoned, this does not threaten the consequentialist
approaches to punishment. Furthermore, certain consequentialist approaches to
punishment that are compatible with the assumption that we lack free will would
seem to generate a more humane and efficient system of criminal law than our
current system. The purpose of this Part is to explain what punishing without free
will would look like and why it is arguably more desirable than a free-willcentered approach to punishment.
A. Criminal Law Without Retribution: Towards an Incompatibilist and
Consequentialist Approach to Punishment
A criminal law without free will would obviously threaten the role of
retribution in justifying punishment. Retribution is the belief that desert is a
sufficient condition for punishment.335 Therefore, retributivists need to ascertain
whether someone deserves to be punished before they can conclude whether
punishing that person is justified.336 When does a person deserve to suffer under a
retributive framework? A person deserves to suffer for doing “X” if, and only if, it
is fair to blame him for having done “X.”337 If we assume that humans do not have
the sort of freedom that undergirds moral responsibility, it necessarily follows that
humans cannot be genuinely blamed for doing what they do. Given that the
absence of blame negates genuine desert, retributive practices would thus be
unjustified in a world without free will.338 From a practical standpoint, this means
that the mere fact that a rational actor did something evil, bad, or wrongful is not in
and of itself a sufficient reason to punish her.
This does not mean that punishment would be unjustified in a world without
free will. Although retributive punishment is ruled out by the assumption that
humans lack free will, the assumption in no way undermines the imposition of
punishment justified on consequentialist grounds.339 Punishment is justified on
335
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consequentialist aims when the benefits of imposing it outweigh the costs of doing
so.340 The paradigmatic consequentialist justification for punishment is deterring
the future commission of offenses.341 Deterrence, in turn, can be general if it deters
the community at large from committing offenses,342 or specific if it is intended to
deter the particular individual who is being punished from committing future
crimes.343 Rehabilitation is another consequentialist justification for punishment
that is closely linked to specific deterrence—the aim of rehabilitation is to modify
the convicted person’s conduct in a way that decreases the chances that she will
recidivate.344 Finally, incapacitation is a consequentialist aim of punishment
usually invoked as a way of neutralizing dangerous offenders who are not
candidates for rehabilitation.345 All of these aims of punishment are not threatened
by assuming that actors lack free will, since: (1) the threat of sanction can certainly
influence the conduct of many actors (i.e., general and specific deterrence)
regardless of whether they freely choose to be influenced by such forces, (2)
behavior modification (i.e., rehabilitation) is perfectly compatible with the
assumption that humans cannot freely determine their acts, and (3) the
neutralization of dangerous individuals (incapacitation) can be achieved whether
the individuals are free actors or not.
Once we shift from retributive to consequentialist punishment, this begs the
question: what should trigger the imposition of punishment? Under a retributive
account of punishment, a finding of blameworthiness would trigger the imposition
of punishment, but such a finding could not justify punishment on consequentialist
grounds. Once blame is taken out of the equation, it is unclear what, if anything,
could take its place.
One alternative is to shift from blameworthiness to dangerousness as a
prerequisite for the imposition of punishment.346 According to this view,
punishment would be justified for the sake of social protection from dangerous
individuals. The actor who commits a crime reveals himself as someone who poses
danger to others. Punishment would thus be conceived as the state’s way of
neutralizing the danger signified by the commission of the offense. In a world
without free will, punishment could be reconceptualized as a vehicle for defusing
dangerousness rather than as a mechanism for exacting retribution.
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B. Punishment as Quarantine (and Other Forms of Societal Protection): More
Humane and Efficient than Retributive Based Punishment?
A good way of illustrating what punishing for dangerousness would look like
is to analogize the practice with the way the state fights contagious diseases. When
a person is diagnosed with a highly contagious disease, it is sensible for society to
take measures to protect itself against the threat.347 These measures are taken
regardless of whether the person who suffers from the disease can be “blamed” for
getting sick.348 The reason for taking these measures is that the sick individual
poses a danger to society, rather than blameworthiness for his condition. Similarly,
the person who commits a crime under the “punishment as a vehicle to defuse
dangerousness” model will often be subjected to certain measures—not because he
deserves to suffer, but instead because his conduct reveals that he poses a danger to
the community. In the case of sick individuals, the severity of the measures will
depend on how dangerous the sickness is believed to be.349 If the sickness is not
particularly dangerous (a common cold, for example), no measures should be
required, while if the sickness is sufficiently dangerous it may require that more
intrusive measures (vaccination, treatment, quarantine, and so forth).350 Similarly,
while no punishment might be required for a person who has committed a de
minimis or trivial offense, a person who has committed a serious offense, such as
murder and who has done so repeatedly, may require the imposition of much
347
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harsher punishment, including incapacitative measures that would be the criminal
law equivalent of quarantine.
One surprising and salutary implication of reconceptualizing punishment as a
vehicle for curbing dangerousness is that doing so will likely lead to less reliance
on incarceration. Despite the fact that prisons were originally conceived as a place
where convicts would go to get rehabilitated,351 it is widely agreed that prisons are
not conducive to rehabilitation.352 In part because prisons are generally viewed as
places that maximize the convict’s suffering instead of places where they can get
the treatment they need.353 Thus, imprisonment is the punishment of choice today
not because it is effective, but because it allows the state and society to make the
convict suffer in order to exact retribution for the harm caused. While this
conception of prisons as houses of suffering may adhere to retributive justice
theory, it does not adhere to the consequentialist approach to punishment. Under a
consequentialist approach, the sanction imposed ought to be the least intrusive
sanction that can achieve the desired end in the most economically efficient
fashion. Mass incarceration does not fit this standard, since imprisonment is among
the costliest and most inefficient forms of punishment.354 A consequentialist
approach to punishment would likely rely as little as possible on incarceration,
given that most cases, including drug and weapon offenses, can be dealt with more
efficiently through less intrusive sanctions. Examples may include supervised
release, probation, drug treatment or intermediate sanctions that are less intrusive
than incarceration but more intrusive than standard probation.355
There is also good reason to believe that the consequentialist approach to
punishment discussed here would push states to assume duties of treatment and
rehabilitation of convicts. The analogy between this model of punishment and the
state’s role in fighting contagious diseases is once again useful to illustrate this
point. When someone is diagnosed with a contagious and dangerous disease, the
government has three important and distinct obligations. First, the government
351
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may defuse the danger presented by the person with the contagious disease.356 As
previously discussed, this can be done in different ways, from prescribing
medication to quarantining individuals.357 Second, the state has a duty to treat the
individual in the most effective way available so that he can resume his normal life
as soon as practicable.358 Finally, given that the individual who contracts a
contagious disease is not considered evil or blameworthy, the state has an
obligation to make the individual’s life—while undergoing treatment or
quarantine—as pain free and pleasant as possible. Similarly, the “punishment as
defusing dangerous offenders” model would lead to three governmental duties,
namely: (1) the duty to defuse the danger posed by the wrongdoer by imposing
some kind of punishment, (2) the obligation to give treatment to the wrongdoer so
that his chances of reincorporating himself to society are increased, and (3) the
duty to make the convict’s serving of his sentence as pain free and pleasant as
possible.
It therefore seems plausible that a consequentialist approach to punishment
like, the one advocated here, will lead to a more humane criminal law—shifting
the focus of punishment from making people suffer to treating people in a way that
maximizes the likelihood that they will once again be able to participate in societal
life without posing serious risks to others. With its emphasis on imprisonment, the
current system leads to abject prison conditions359 and an overreliance on
incarceration. In contrast, with its emphasis on curbing dangerousness and
maximizing good consequences, the consequentialist approach to punishment
discussed here would likely lead to less use of prison sanctions and more use of
alternative methods of punishment—for example, home detention, treatment for
drug and sex offenders, fines, supervised release, and community work.
Increased reliance on these alternative punishments would make our criminal
law more humane, compassionate and in tune with our current understanding of
human behavior and techniques of behavior modification. Furthermore, this
alternative model will likely be more economically efficient than one that relies
primarily on incarceration as the preferred type of punishment. Given that
imprisonment is a very costly type of punishment,360 incarcerating offenders
should be a measure of last resort. As the literature on the costs of punishment
illustrates, we have good reasons to impose imprisonment sanctions only when the
risk of detection is extremely low and the offense committed is particularly
356
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grave.361 While such a sparse and economically efficient use of incarceration
would be difficult to justify under a retributive criminal law, it would be very easy
to justify under the consequentialist model of punishment discussed here.

C. Objections to Viewing Punishment as a Vehicle for Defusing Dangerousness
and Replies to the Objections
1. Viewing Punishment as a Vehicle for Defusing Dangerousness Would Justify
Punishing the Innocent
Up to this point, this Article has demonstrated that adopting a consequentialist
approach to punishment that eschews any reference to desert and blame as a
justification for punishment has many appealing implications. It must be
acknowledged, however, that several important objections can be leveled against
this conception of punishment. The first and most obvious objection is that any
approach to punishment that dispenses with blame could justify punishing the
innocent. This is a classic objection to consequentialist approaches to
punishment.362 The retributive model of punishment easily avoids this objection,
since the requirement of blame is built in to retributive justice. More specifically,
blaming an innocent individual is unjust under a retributive model, for retributive
punishment is only justified if the offender deserves to suffer and desert is a
function of blame.363 Consequentialist approaches to punishment cannot avoid the
problem easily, for blame is not a prerequisite for punishment under these
theories.364 This is an objection that must be taken seriously, as there is something
intuitively troubling about a theory that might justify punishing the innocent.
If punishing the innocent means punishing someone who cannot be genuinely
blamed for his conduct, then the consequentialist approach to punishment defended
here inevitably leads to punishing the innocent. Given that the point of departure of
the theory is that no one can be genuinely blamed for his acts, there is no way to
escape this conclusion. Nevertheless, this concession is not as damning as it may
seem at first glance, for we currently deprive children and the mentally ill of their
freedom when they engage in wrongful yet blameless acts. Similarly, the model of
punishment defended here would lead to imposing sanctions on blameless
individuals who have engaged in wrongful acts. Thus, the only difference between
the model defended here and our current approach to punishment is that under the
model defended here sanctions imposed on blameless individuals count as
“punishment,” whereas under the current model these sanctions are regarded as
361
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preventative measures. The differences between my proposed model and the
current approach to punishment are mostly terminological and not of much
normative significance. Furthermore, if punishing the innocent means punishing
someone who has not engaged in wrongdoing, then the theory defended here does
not lead to punishing the innocent.365 People who have not engaged in wrongful
conduct should not be punished under the “punishment as a vehicle for defusing
dangerousness” view, because the occurrence of a wrongful act is the event that
triggers the prediction of future dangerousness.
2. Viewing Punishment as a Vehicle for Defusing Dangerousness Would Lead to
Punishing People Before They Act
Another objection to the view of punishment discussed here would be that
focusing on dangerousness might lead to punishing dangerous people before they
even engage in an act.366 This objection is inspired in part by Orwellian views367 of
a future that would look like the one depicted in the film Minority Report,368 in
which three “pre-cognizant” human oracles can identify future criminals before
they engage in the criminal act.369 This would, in turn, cast doubt upon the socalled act requirement—one of the most venerable and foundational doctrines of
criminal law. It might also lead to punishing people for merely contemplating or
thinking about committing an offense if such thoughts are believed to be indicative
of dangerousness. This is not only normatively unappealing, but also
constitutionally suspect. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that imposing
punishment on people for so-called status offenses violates the Eighth Amendment
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments.370 Thus, an individual must be
punished for what he has done, not for who he is. Furthermore, it is widely
365
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believed that the Constitution also proscribes punishing mere thoughts or internal
deliberations in the absence of some sort of act that demonstrates the firmness of
their intentions.371
The first reply to this objection is that there is currently no machine or human
that can predict with accuracy whether a given individual will commit a crime in
the future.372 Therefore, the risk of punishing someone who is not really dangerous
based on abstract predictions of dangerousness is quite high. Given that the harm
caused as a result of punishment in such cases is quite significant (deprivation of
freedom in many cases), we have good reasons to inflict such harm only if there is
near certainty about the triggering conditions that justify its infliction
(dangerousness, according to the theory of punishment discussed here). Since we
currently do not have the capacity to predict with any degree of certainty whether
particular individuals who have not committed a wrongful act in the past will
behave dangerously in the future, we ought to abstain from punishing people
before they act based on predictions of dangerousness that are not grounded on the
commission of prior wrongful acts. But what if sometime in the future we develop
Minority Report-type technologies that allow us to predict future criminal acts with
great accuracy well before that person commits an offense?373 Would it be
acceptable to punish those persons before they engage in the wrongful conduct? If
these cases ever arise in the future (this is a very big “if”), it might be legitimate to
take action against the individual before he acts, and in some extreme cases
limiting the actor’s freedom might be warranted. However, it might be better to
treat these cases as instances of civil confinement, for it is not clear whether it
makes sense to talk about “punishing” someone who has yet to do anything
wrongful.374
D. Punishing Without Free Will—Summary
The conventional wisdom is that it would be normatively unappealing to
assume that humans lack free will. Making such an assumption would lead to an
impoverished view of life and an unattractive system of criminal justice. Despite
371

See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”).
372
Some jurisdictions currently use a computer program that can help predict whether
certain convicts are more or less likely to recidivate. Professor Richard Berk of the
University of Pennsylvania developed the program. Professor Berk acknowledges,
however, that the program “[is not] anywhere near being able to do [what the Minority
Report pre-cognizants could do].” Daniel Bates, The Real Minority Report: U.S. Police
Trial Computer Software That Predicts Who Is Most Likely to Commit a Crime, DAILY
MAIL ONLINE, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1306070 (last updated Aug.
25, 2010 5:44 PM).
373
Media reports are already drawing parallels between Professor Berk’s program and
the machines used in Minority Report to predict future crimes. Id.
374
This, in a sense, is something we already do when we decide we deal with a case
of civil confinement.

1460

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No. 4

its intuitive appeal, there are good reasons to believe that the conventional wisdom
is wrong. Assuming that humans lack free will would lead to eliminating
retribution as a justification for the imposition of punishment. Contrary to what
avowed retributivists would have us believe, discarding retribution does not make
our criminal justice system less attractive. A criminal law that does not rely on
retribution as a justification for punishment ought to conceive punishment as a way
of neutralizing dangerous offenders. Conceptualizing criminal law this way is
likely to lead to a more economically efficient and humane system of criminal
justice that relies less on incarceration and more on treatment and rehabilitation.
As a result, there are good reasons to believe that assuming that humans lack free
will would generate a more normatively appealing criminal law than the one we
have today and this, in turn, provides us with good reasons to embrace an
incompatibilist solution to the free will problem.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article opened with a reference to Voltaire’s Candide.375 In this
celebrated book, Voltaire called our attention to the problem of free will by
contrasting Candide’s view that what makes humans special is a kind of freedom
that is lacking in other animals, with Martin’s view that determinism rules out the
possibility of free will and, perhaps, moral responsibility. Since Candide was
published many philosophers, scientists, and legal theorists have proposed
different ways of solving the free will problem. After all this time, it can be
asserted with confidence that there is no “knockout” argument that demonstrates
that free will is compatible or incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. In
the face of this dialectical stalemate, this Article has argued that we ought to
decide whether to hold on to or abandon free will by asking whether assuming that
we have free will is more or less normatively appealing than making the opposite
assumption. This Article suggests that there are good reasons to believe that the
most normatively attractive way out of the free will maze is to assume the
incompatibility of determinism and indeterminism with the type of freedom that
lies at the core of contemporary criminal law and theory. Doing so would not make
our lives any less appealing, and it could lead to a more humane and efficient
system of criminal justice than one that assumes than that we are endowed with the
sort of free will that undergirds judgments of blame and praise. Consequently,
contrary to what most philosophers and criminal scholars argue, punishing without
free will is not less appealing than the alternative.
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